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Abstract
in order to overcomethe limitations of convent ional design techniques oftotally
self-checking (TSC) circuits and provide simple, convenient, and system ati c design
tech niques, we formalize a new two-element morphic Boolean algebr a - stron g
morp hic Boolean algebra 85M - and propose a new classification of checkers.
Basedon these, wehavedevelopedthree typesof universal two-rail (TR) totally self-
checking (TSC) basic building blocks (BBB) - EIS BBBs, EISS BBBs, and EnS
n nBs . Besides, a group of T R·TSC multl-funetlon BBBs has also been proposed.
T hese ODDs, like ordinary logic gates in common digital circuits, ca n be easily
used to implement any arbitrary combinat ional logic using our propo sed design
rules. The result ing circuit is a TR-TSC circuit.
A simple intcf<:onnttlion meth od (SIM) and an imege design met hod (10 M)
for the design of T R-TSC circuits have been proposed. The 81M is suitable for
th e CMe tha t the 3elf-ttsling property can be easily achieved or verified. The 10M
dea ls with the general case that includes complicated logic functions with a large
num ber of inputs.
We also present a new method to design a TSC circuit with separate error-input
ind ication (E I) and separate inte rnal fault indicat ion (IF). T his objective bee been
achieved by using a new BBB - a TR-TSC decoupling BBB (D C2 ) .
An efficient method of diagnosing relevant error sources has been st ud ied. With
the help of decoupling circuits consisting of DC2's, the error status of relevant
inputs and outpu ts CAnbe indicated . This greatl y improves localizability and en-
han ces mainta inability. A tota lly new circuit concept named r.nvr-c onfin ingcireuil
has been introduced. T It-TSC error-confining (ECF) circuits implement given logic
rUllctions durin! rault-rreeoperation. But when any in~rn &l. rault Irom a prescribed
set or raulls OCCUr1, the circuit aut omatically rormaseveral independent areAS which
are surrounded by isolat ion boundaries . Thus, the rault is confined to a special area
and indicated. This pr~rty enhanees localizability, maintainabil ity and availabil-
ity. A TSC double-input deceupling (Dl DC) BBO, which ia .. key component to be
used in constructi ng the isolation boundaries, hu been developed.
Th e design problems or TSC sequential DOOa have also been discussed. A
scheme for designing T SC D flip-flop has been proposed.
In addition, we have also developed an efficient rombinxtional TSC checker for
l-out-of-J code. The proposed checker uses less hardware, has fewer gale levels,
and possesses a higher test capability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The motivation for the research
Totally self-checking (TSC) circui ts (1]. [21are highly desirab le for ult rahighly reli-
able digita l system design (3)- [6). The supe riority of TSC circuits to other digital
circuits is mainly reflected on three aspects . First , temporary faults - tran sient
faults and intermitt ent faults are detected; second, faults are immediat ely detected
upon occurrence; third, software diagnostic programs are no longer necessary (3)-
[6}.
Considerab le work bas been done on th e design of TSC circui ts [IJ- [31]. How-
ever, unlike t he design of ordinary logic circuits which has not only a group of logic
gates and a set of sequentia l logic blocks available, but also has Boolean algebra
as its theoret ical basis, neither genera l t heory nor universa l basic build ing blocks
(DBBs) are available for the design of TSC circuits . Exist ing two-rail (T R) totally
self-checking (TSC) operator blocks (9], {1l]- [16], [31] are only suitable for t he de-
sign of TSC checkers [9], [11]-(16], (231. Thus, existing techniques for designing
TSC circuits remain complicated , inflexible and non-systematic, and to construct
a TSC circuit is st ill a challenging work.
1.2 Objec tives and organization of the Thesis
In th is thes is_ developing a group of univcfnl BBB. and form..Jizins a general
theo ry for the desi,!!;D of TS C circuits are our two main objectives.
A brieroverview on the development and major techniques of fault tole rance haa
been given in Chapter f . In comparison to !IOftw&rf: scheme of fault toleran ce, hard-
ware scheme possesses & higher speed and reliability, es~cially the TS C techniques
prov ide concurrent error det ection lor both temporary and permanent er rcra.
In Chapter 3, we have summed up the existing design methods (or T R·TSC
checkers. H shows tha t TR-TSC checkers not only can be independent TS C checkers
to check either TSC funct ional circuits but also are widely used in design ing other
useful TSC checkers. TR·TSC checkers can be constructed by only two-input two-
variable complU'alors (N, ), AI well as by uni versal opera tor blocks.
A new Boolean &l.gebra called strong rncrphic Boolean &l.gebra B SM hI.!! been
formalized in Charier l . T his new Boolean algebra deals with two-element morphic
variable! and possesses bot h the properties of uaual Boolean algebra B. and con-
ventional morph ic Boolean algebra BM • We also have proposed a new dUllification
of checkers. According to t he new classificatio n. five type! of checkers have been
defined .
B~ on BSM and new defini tions of checkers , four groups of universal TR -
TSe BBDs have been developed in Chapter 5. T hese (our group s of BBBs are
error-input sensiti ve (EIS) BBBs, error -Input semi-eensifive (EISS) BBBs, error-
input insensit ive (EllS) DBBs, and a group o( TR.TS C multi -function (MF) BOBs.
T hese universal DDDs can be eas ily ap plied to the design of TR·TSC circuits, and
are parLicularly efficient for TR-TSC fundion&l.circuit • .
In Chapter 6, we have descr ibed two design techniqu es to const ruct TR -TSC
circuits using the proposed BBBs and previous operator blocks. A simple inter-
connection method (81M) has been proposed and it is suitable for the case where
the Jelj -teJting prope rty can be easily achieved or verified . For the general case, we
have proposed a design technique called image design method (10M). T his method
ca n be used to design TSC circuits which imp lement any given comb inational logic
functions. It enhances t he testability, and the self-testin g prope rty of resultin g cir-
cuits is easy to beverified . A new block called TR-T8C decouplin g BBB (DC2 ) has
been developed . DC2 is very usefu l and efficient for des igning a new class of TSC
chec kers which have a sepa rate error-input ind ication (EI) and a separate inte rnal
fault indication (IF). Decoupling techniques for relevant er ror ind ication variables
has been studied. The deccupling techn ique provides a new way to locate faulty
units and greatly imp roves maintainability. T he concepts of isolati on boundary and
error-confining (ECF) circuit have been intro duced . Properly using th e proposed
BBBs,a new generation of TSC circuits which have the capability of confining er-
rors can be ach ieved. An auxiliary block called TR -TSC double-input decc upling
(OIDe) BBBhas been developed. T his block is particularly useful for const ructin g
the isolation boundaries.
In Chapter 7, we have proposed an efficient TSC combi national checker for l -ou t-
of-3 code. The checker itse lf is not a T R·TSC checker. However, the achieveme nt
of th e checker is based on the principles of TR-TSC checker and mor phic space
theory.
In Chapler 8, thi s thesis i3 concluded and recommendations for further resea rch
are discussed.
Chapter 2
An overview of fault tolerance
2.1 T he import an ce of fault t olera nce
As th e theoret ical basis of fault tolerance , the history of fault-to lerant comput-
ing dates back to the early 1940's when the evolution of computin g syste ms reached
the level of comple xity of t he relay computers developed by Harvard University and
Bell Telephone Laboratories {32J.
Designers of the first electronic computer, the ENIAC, were likewise aware of
the extreme reliability requirements associated with the operation of a complex
comp ut ing system . In the words of n. H. Goldstine , one of t he principal developers
of the ENIAC[33):
"To gain some roughmeasure of the magnitude of the risk3 (in un-
dertaking the development 0/ the ENIAC) we should realize that the
proposed machine turned oul to contain over 17000 tube, of 16 differ-
ent types operatingat a fundamental clock which issued a signal every
10 I-IS. Thus, once every IOI-ISan erro r would occur if a single one of
the 17000 lubes operatedincorrtc/ly; this means that in a single second
there ee re 1.1 6illion (=1.1 x 100) chonu, of_failure occurring and
in a dar (=100000$) abovt 1.1 x 101• chancu. Pit in olhertoo nU, the
contemplat«l mamine hoJ to opend e VJiIh a pro6G6iJitr of malfund ion
of a60ut " pan in IOU in order for it to rI ,,/or I t II IIlitho.t erro r . Man
had neeer mode all irutrvment copd le of opendin g lcith thu degrr:e 01
fidditr or reliG6i/ity, an d lhif if tDhy the . nd u i a! i", "'II.!I $a risi:y a one
and the accompluhment '0 great. •
The reliability requirements of t he ENIAC were met , for the meet part, th rouKb
careful selection, pretest ing, and use of each component. However, a.'I early aa 1916
it became clear t hat , all th e physical and logical complexity of electronic compute rs
increased , othe r precaut ions would have to be taken to enhance the reliability and
availability of compu ting systems.
In 1948, J. von Neumann proposed tha t the compo nent. of a computer should
be viewed as having a. nonzero proba.hility of failure and suggested trip le mod ular
redundancy (TMR) as a means of improving system reliability (341. In von Neu·
mann's belief, th e correct way to design fau lt-tolerant computin g systems wu to
ut ilize redundant components in eome system atic Il"anner, th e TMR scheme being
but one way of doing this.
It was the establishment of the IEEE Comp uter Society Technical Committeeon
Fault -Tolerant Computi ng in May 1910 t hat both t heoretical and practic al upec:ts
of fault -to lerant computing began to grow steadily (321, [351.
Faul t- toterant comput ing hlL!l been defined &S "t he abili ~y tc execute specified
elgcrithms correctly regerdleea of hardware failurCl, total ayetem flaws, or program
fal lacies" (35). Baaically the technology of fault-tolerAlit computing encompal lel
theory and techniques of fault and error detect ion and correction, modeling, an&!.-
ysis, synth esis, and architecture of fault·toler&ll t 8ystema and their evaluation 135J.
ft can be classified into three areas:
• The design and analysis of fault-tolerant circuits and systems;
• The di&gnoois and testing of digital circuits and systems;
• The validation of programs or ~softwlU'e reliability" .
With the recent revolut ionary changes in circuit technology, more and more
VLSI and ULSI chips axe used as the core and auxiliary components and aimed
at achieving high speed, more functions, and broader fields of applications. These
require th at modern computers have ultrahigh reliability, ultrahig h availability,
reduced life-cycle costs, and long-lifeapplications [5]. As a prerequisite, high quality
chips must be used in building a reliable computer; therefore, we still can not
build a commercially feasible computer depending only OD these chips. The highly-
integrated chip doubles the complexity of its internal circuits. Also, the chip itself
becomessusceptible to a more diverse variety of failures. Besides internal opens and
shorts and bonding failures, there are othe r fault modes, such as bridging faults,
stuck-at faults, and crOlIspoint faults. Some defective cells exist when a chip hASjust
been made, and some sprout up with the wear-out course. The uncontrollability and
unobservability of the highly-integrated chip make it impossible to diagnoee these
faulty units promptly. fn order to solve these problems, variuus fault-tolerance
measures are employed in highly reliable computers 13]-(6].
Fault toleran ce in a highly reliable digital system is achieved through redun-
dancy in hardware, software, information, and/or computa tion. Fault-tolerance
strategies consist of the following elements (36).
• Masking: Dynamic correction of generated errors.
• Detect ion: Detection of an error - a symptom of a fault .
• Containment: Prevention of error propagation &CrOlla defined boundaries.
• Diagnosis: Identificat ion of the faulty module respcneible for a detected error.
• Repair/re configuration: Elimination or replacement of a faulty component ,
or a mechanism for by-passing it .
• Recovery: Correction of the system to a atate acceptable for continued oper-
ation .
For short-ter m ultrareliable operation, where no time is available for off-line
fault diagnosis and repair, a static or pasalve configuration of elements is designed
to mask a given maximum number of faultll [36J.
Dynamic redundancy, on the other hand, involves the switching of modules or
rerouti ng of communications as faults occur. The faulty components are detected ,
diagnosed, and repaired or replaced [361.
In a hybrid approach, a static base configuration maeke a given number of
faults, while faulty modules are detected and replaced within the configuration.
Hybrid redundancy is desirable for long-term ultrereliable applicat ions in which
the probability of multiple faults is high (36J.
High availability applicat ions do not necessarily require continuous error-free
operation, although database and other critical resources must be protected and
contained within replaceable modules, rather than rneaked. System operation is
then degraded or halted to perform diagnosis, reconfigureticn or repair, and recov-
" y [361·
2.2 Common schemes of fault tolerance
As we know, the reliability enhancement of computi ng eyeteme ia achieved
th rough two funda mentally different approaches. The fir ~t approach is called fault
prevention (a lso known iL'I fault intolerance) and the second is fa ult toleran ce. In
the lrouljt ional fault prevent ion a pproach, the ob jec tive is to iacresse the reliability
by a pr iori e limination of all faults . Since tbi. Ie a.Im08t impossible to achieve in
practice, the goa.!of fault prevention is to reduce the probability orsystem failure
to an acceptably low value. In the fault tolerance approach, faul tl are expected
to occur during computation but their effect! are automatically counteract ed by
incorporat ing redundancy into a system so that valid computat ion can continue
even in th e presence of faults. These facilities consist of more hardware , more
software or more time, or a combinat ion of all these; they are redundant in the
sense that th ey could be omitt ed from a fault -free syste m wit hout &lfecti ng its
operatio n.
Fault tolerance is not a replac ement but rather a supplement to the most im-
port ant principl es of reliable syste m design: (a) use the most reliable oompon ents
(however, cost const raints often preclude the ir use); and (b) keep the eyete m aa
simple as pceelble, consiste nt with achieving t he design objectives .
Redundancy can be impleme nted in stat ic, dyn amic, or hybrid configuration 8
[31-[61·
2.2.1 Static redundancy
Static red unda ncy, also known as "masking redundancy", usee extra compo-
nents, and th e effed of a faulty component is masked instantancously. Two major
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Figure 2.1: Triplicated voters and modules forming one tripl e modular-redunda nt
stage of system, with voting at module inputs copied from Ref [361.
techniques employed to obta in fault masking are the t riple modular redundancy
(T MR) and the use of error correcting codes [41. (36). For example, a TMR syst em
136)is shown in Figure 2.1.
Cont inuous opera tion is often provided by using t he ma jority vote of the outp uts
of three or more identica l modules, masking failure of the minority. Triple modular
redundancy (TMR) has been used extensively in ultr a-reliab le systems for aerospace
and industr ial appl ications, with two out of th ree votes masking single-module
failures.
Coding is the most widely developed mechanism for error detection, correct ion
and masking in dil!:ital system, typically requiring ItslJ redundancy than other er-
ror detection, correction and masking schemes (37). A code's error detection and
correct ion properties &re based on its ability to part ition a set of 2- n·bit words
into a code space of 2- words and a. noncode apace of 2'" - r words. For most
codes, each word comprises rn·bita of information and k .. n - rn check bils. Each
code is designed 50 tha t a given number of errore traDtforms a code-space word
into a word in the noncode-space. Ecron are detected by decoding circuits th.t
identify any word outside the code-space. Enor correction is performed by more
extcO!live decoding that uniquely aascciatee a.ncnccde-epece word with the original
code word t ransformed by the errors.
Hamming distance between the words of the code space determines the cepe-
bility of error dctection or correction of a given code-space. The meet common
words include simple pari ty checks to detect errore in bueee, memory, and registen .
Parity-based Hamming codes detect and correct erton in memory; cyclic redan-
dancy checks and other cyclic codes detect and eorrect erTOn in communiCAtion
channels and disk storage; m-out-o£·n codes detect errors in microprogram control
sto res and other ROMs; and ar ithmet ic codes detect errore originat ing within arith-
met ic logic units (ALU). Unidirectional error control codes have found a real-time
application in "LSI microprocessors, where the bus line &rea increases as the pro-
cesser word length increases. Since these lines connect circuit elements, line faulta
or defects seriously affect LSI chip yield and reliability [3]-(6), [36).
Figure 2.2 shows t:, bus line circuit t hat can mask single "0" errors. The decoder
G consists of AND ga.tcs 90 lo 9~, corresponding to code words l'o to ~ in code
C. Because each gate has transistors at the bus line where the element in the code
word is "I", a gate is only act ivated by receipt of the corresponding code word.
10
In general, when "0" erro rs change the code word Y to y ' , any other code word,
s~,y X, in C has to satisfy the condition XY' '" O. This causes the bus line circuit
tu work correctly. This condition shows that there are one or more cases where X
has 1 at the position where y ' has O. From thls it can be easily proved that a code
C with A."" t + 1 can mask! asymmetric errors [37).
As implementation cost, for error-control coding continue to decrease, the de-
velopment of cost-effective, low-level techniques may offset the need for massive
high-level redundancy. The refore, the major challenge of th e future is developing
an integrated design framework where we can study the various trad e-offa bet ween
low-level and high-level redundancy techniques.
11
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Figure 2.2: Circuit for masking single, unidirectional "0" erro rs on bus line copied
from Ref [37J.
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2.2.2 Dynamic re dundancy
Dynamic redundancy is else known as "Standby Redundancy". In the dynamic
redundancy, spare modules are switched into the system when working modules
break down (3J-[61.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the concept of dynamic redund ancy [4J. The system con-
sists of S + 1 modules but only one operates at a t ime. If a fault is det ected in
the working modules, it is switched out and replaced by a spare. Thus, dynamic
redundancy requires consecutive actions of fault detect ion and faul t recovery.
Recovery is defined as the continuation of system funct ion after the incidence
of an error in data integrity.
The detectio n of fault in the individual modules of a dynamic system can be
achieved by using one of the following techniques [41:
1. Periodic tests;
2. Self-checking circuits ;
3. Watchdog timers.
In periodic tests, the norma l operatio n of the funct ion modu le is tem porarily
suspended and a test routine is run to determine if fault s are present in the module.
A disadvant age of th is techniq ue is that it cannot detect tempo rary faults unless
they occur while the module is tested.
Self-checking circuits are designed so that they either provide correct output or
indicate the presence of a fault in a module dur ing normal operati on.
Watchdog timers are set to certai n values at pre-establis hed points, called check-
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Uu lpu l
Figure 2.3: Dynamic redundancy scheme with S spares copied from Ref [41.
points, in the program executed by a module. A timer at a particular checkpoint
counts down while the module performs its function, and is normally reset before
th e next checkpoint is reached. However, a soft WAre bug or a hardware fault will
prevent the program from l'CICUing the timer. The ti mer then issues an interrupt
command which caUICI auto mat ic switch over to a . pare module.
Dynamic redundant sys tems can also be classified to cold-stand by system and
hot-standb y system (4J, [36J.
In a cold-standb y system, one module is powered up and operat ional, the rest
are not powered. Replacement of a fault module by a spAte is effected by turning
off its power and powering a spare. In a hot-standby system, all the modules are
powered up and operating simultaneously. if the output of all modules are the
same, the output of any arbitrarily selected module can be taken as the system
outp ut. When a fault is detected in a module, the system is reconfigured !IO that
the system output cornellfrom one of the remaining modules.
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Figure 2.4: Hybrid redundancy system with TMR scheme and S spare modules
copied from Ref (4).
2.2.3 Hybrid red u nda ncy
Hybrid redundancy combines the static and the dynamic redundancy approaches.
It. consists of an NMR system (in general) with a set of spare modules. When one
or less than n = (N - 1)/2 of the NAtR modules fails, it is replaced by a spare
and the basic NMR operat ion can continue {41. (36J. A hybrid scheme is shown in
Figure 2.4 (4J.
Redundancy can also be implemented by other hardware redundant techniques
such as self-purging redundancy, and silt·o ut modular redundancy (SMR) (4).
Replacement unite can be either hoi or cold (36J. A hot spare concurrently
performs the same operat ions as the module it is to replace, needing no initializat ion
where it is switched into the system. A cold spare is either not powered or used
for other tMks, requiring initialization when switched into the system. System
designer must weigh the cost of unused spare against that of initiiUizatior. time
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when deciding between hot and cold spares.
2.2.4 T im e redundancy
Time redundancy is commonly used in the detection and correction of errors
caused by temporary faults {4]. It involves the repetitio n or rollback of instructions,
segments of programs or ent ire programs immediately after a fault is detected.
The rollback operation requires tha t a program restarts processing from the last
checkpoint, where all the informat ion relevant to the successful execu tion of the
program beyond the checkpoint is stored. If a fault is temporary, rollback the
program to a checkpoint should allow successful recovery. However, if the fault is
permanent, the fault detection mechanism will be activated again and an alternat ive
recovery method should be attempted.
2.2 .5 Software redundan cy
Redundancy, which is used to achieve fault tolerance in hardware, has not found
wide application in software. The main problem is that it is not possible to quant ify
the expected improvement in reliability that can be achieved by using additional
software. Chen and Avizienis have suggested the idea of N-version progromming
for providing fault tolerance in software (4J.
In the N-version programming approach, a number of independently written
programs for a given function are run simultaneously, results are obta ined by voting
upon the outputs from the individual programs. In general, the requirement that
the individual programs should provide identical outputs is ext remely str ingent.
Therefore, in practice sufficiently similar out put from each program is regarded as
equivalent. However,this increases the complexity of the voter. In addition to its
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ability to tolerate design faults , N-version programming is also capable of masking
cert ain categor ies of temporary hardware faults.
2.2.6 Fail -soft ope ra t ion
If a faulty system hee ability to continue to operate at an acceptable but reduced
levelof performance, when the faulty modules are disconnected from the system and
the rest of the system are reconfigured, th is ability is known as fail-90ft operation
[4J .
In order to achieve the capab ility of fail-soft operation, a system must have a
distr ibuted architecture , a comprehensive fault detection capability, the ability to
achieve both logic and power isolation between functional modules, and the ability
to reconfigure itself to operate as efficiently as possible without a fault module.
T he space shuttle computer complex is an example of this stra tegy. It uses
four processors with majority voting for crit ical operations. Voting cont inues after
one failure, but a second failure ends voting and a single processor performs all
rema ining opera tions.
2.2 .7 Practical fault-tolerant systems
By the end of the 1960's nearly all of the basic forms of fault-tolerant architec-
ture to be found in later designs had been built and experimented with (e.g., trip-
lication with voting, duplica tion and comparison, self-checking units, and backup
sparing). These concepts were refined and adapted to more modern hardware and
software technology in subsequent computers 141, [381,[39J.
T wo very advanced research machines were developed to the same spcdfica -
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tiona by the same NASA sponsor, and were built and tested u prototypes: the
Cault ·to lerant multiprocessor (FT M PJ and software implemented fault tolerance
(SIF T) . Simplified blockdiagrams of the two architectures are shown in Figure 2.5.
Doth systems execute three copies of a program in different hardware and vote
the result s to mask faults but they do it in quite different ways. All processors in
the FTMP are d ock synchronized and vot ing is done by hardware. Processors in
SIFT use independent doc ks, and voting and synchronization are carried out by
software.
In the FT MP st ructure, a set of processors and memories arc connected to five
redundant buses th rough special redundant bus guardian circuits. Prcceescre and
memory modules can be dynamically assigned to be a member of a group of three
processors and th ree memories which will run the same computation (designate d a
tr iad) . This is done by commanding their associated bus guardians to commun icate
over specially assigned buses. The guardian circuits in the processors vote on the
three copies of data arriving from their assigned memories, and conversely the
memories guardian vote on information from their assigned processors. If a bus,
processor, or memory fails, there willstill be twovalid copiesof information at each
voter, and the fault will be masked, allowing the triad to continue. When such a
failure occurs, a different triad can sense the condition and reconfigure the affected
t riad by sending commands to bus guardians to assign a new processor, memory,
or bus to the affected triad.
T he SIFT computers are tota lly connected. Each computer can broadcast a
message over a serial line to dedicated buffers in all the other computers . The
computers operate with unsynchronized hardware clocks, and synchronizat ion cc-
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cure by a software, voting process. Each computer conta.insa synchronous software
executive, and software voting procedures. Periodically, the computers exchange
messages containing their views of the time, and develop a consensus ea its value.
As user processes are scheduled in a time-synchronous fashion, they are executed
at approximately (but not exactly) the same time and send their results to the
other processors where a software voting procedure is invokedto meek faults . If a
computer fails and generates disagreeing outputs , the other two ignore it.
In practice the FTMP architecture has two major advantages over SIFT in
dedicated real-time control applications. It runs faster than SIFT because its vot-
ing is done by hardware. The SIFT computers use a significant percentage of their
processing time running the software voting and synchronization programs. More
importantly, the fault-toterant features of FTM P are nearly software transparent.
Nearly any software executive can be run on FTMP with fault recovery procedures
written to run under it . (Remember, the triads willcontinue to operate under fault
conditions until a reconfiguration procedure is invoked). SIF T , on the other hand,
is constrained to using its custom synchro nous executive which implements the
fault-tolerance features.
Although the relative hardware cost of a highly fault-tolerant computer may he
several times that of a non-fault-tolerant machine, hardware prices have dropped
an even greater relative amount making fault tolerance coat-effective for a large
number of applications.
Adv anced inform at ion pro cessin g system (AlPS)
Figure 2.6 is a structur e of the advanced information processingsystem (AlPS)
(381. A group of processing sites is connected through switching nodes to a redun-
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dant inter-communication str ucture which behaves like a triply redundant bus, but
which can be circuit -switched over different paths to provide physical damage tol-
erance. Each processing site may be a fault-tolerant multiprocessor (FT M P), a
triplicated (TMR) fault-tolerant processor (FT P), a duplicated pair of processors,
or a. single non-redundant machine. Each site has a local clock which synchronizes
computers at that site, but clocks are not synchronized between sites. Hardware
voting is done throug hout the system. With a. site containing trip licated (T MR)
processors, voting is straightforward because the processors are clock-synchronized
and are executing identical programs. Voting of t riplicated data sent between
processing sites with different local docks requires a hardware synchronizat ion op-
erat ion. but the data skew can probably be kept small and hardware voting is still
feasible. This design recognizes the needs for selective redundancy. In a complex
system. not all tasks are sufficiently crit ical to justiCyt riplicat ing their proceeeora.
Thus, duplex and single processors can be included.
In general. the hardware implementation of a fault-tolerant systems is natu rally
achieved at several levels based on funct ions provided by specific subsystems. It
ccmtains redundant components and recovery mechanisms which may be employed
in different ways at different levels. For example, at the highest level, a distri buted
system may recover from a failed computer by shifting its computat ions to othe r
machines. At the next lower level, a single compute r may be capable of replacing
a faulty memory module with a spare and switching to alternat ive communicat ion
channels to circumvent a failed part, but may not be able to recover when a short
occurs on the local memory-processorbus or when its powersupply fails. At a lower
level, the memory modules may be capable of replacing defective RAM chips with
spares, or the chips may contain redundancy and be capable of tolerating certai n
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failures but not others.
2.3 Self-checking (SC)
For fault detection, modules at aJllevels [computers , logic modules, or on-chip
redundancy), fall between two basic types. At one ext reme are circuits which can
detect internal faults concurrently with normal operat ion - we will call them sclf-
checking (SC) - and at the other extreme are modules which have no internal fault
detection capa bility which will be designated non"elf-checking (NSC) [38J. When
used in a redundan t partition, SC modules can be operat ed singly, since faults will
he detected, if an external recovery mechanism can substitute a spare module for
the one which bas failed. NSC modules must be duplicated and operated two-at-
a-time with outp uts compared for fault detect ion and, three-at-a-time and voted if
a faulty module is to be identified quickly (or if transient faults arc to be located).
Self-checking circuits offera number of advantages, the most obvious of which
is the immediate detection of errors. Another is the capability of detect ing er-
rors caused by t ransient failure. Further, self-checking circuits are becoming more
attractive with the advancement in VLSI technology [3J-[6\.
A self-checking computer can be developed at an approximately 10 percent
increase in hardware complexity {40]. The reason for this relatively lowcost is t hat
the majority of a computer's logic is memory which due to its regular structure
can be designed to detect faults with a few extra bits per word. Irregular logic
must often he du plicated, but this makes up a small percentage of many modern
machines.
An important characteristic of this methodology is the Iact that ,e lf-checking
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checkers have been developed which signal faults in the checking circuitry as well
&II in the operational circuits. T his largely solves th e problem of "who checks the
checker?" Unecking signals are implemented as complementary morphicp airs which
alternate between values (to) and (01) when no error exists. Upon detecting an
error in the circuits being checkedor in the checking circuits , these signals ta ke on
values (11) or (00) indicating a fault has occurred. A redu ction circuit has been
developed so that a number of these complementary pairs from individual checkers
can he reduced to a. single self-checked pair which serv es as a. maste r fault indicator
[381. A general str ucture of TSC circuit is shown in Figure 2.7.
A TSC circuit is composed of two parts - a TSC funct ional circuit and a TSC
checker [6J. The TSC functional circuit implements given functions during fault-
freeoperation. Th e T SC checker monitors the outputs of functional circuit, internal
error propagation pa ths of the T SC functional circuit, as well as the inputs of the
TSC funct ional circuit .
It any error inpu t is applied to its inputs or any int ernal fault from a prescribed
set or fault occurs in the Junctional circuit or in the checker itself the output of the
checker will indicate th is fault dur ing normal operat ion.
T here are many works on the design or self-checking circuits, especially on the
design of TSC checkers such as parity code checkers , duplication checkers, par ity
prediction checkers, m-out-of-n codes checkers, Berger codes checkers, and residue
code checkers [3)-[61. Thesecheckers have already been applied in an adaptive man-
ner to some functional circuits, for example, adders, multipliers, decoding circuits,
data path circuits, and the like.
Unlike the design of non-redundant logic circuits, there is no simple, conve-
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nient, syste mat ic meth od available for desisning TSC circuits, particularly for TSC
functional circuits.
Moreover, the st ructu re of conventional TSC circuits is very complicated. Th is
leads to a low localizability. We need a more complicated decoding circuit if the
correction scheme is employed.
Consequently, it is desirable to provide a general meth od to design TSC circuits
which.makes the design of TSC function,,),and TSC checkers consistent and efficient.
2.4 Concluding remarks
The development of the technologyof fault tolerance has been drivenby high re-
quirements of modern military system, astronauts, aerospace miaalona, commercial
activities, commuuicatloua, etc. Fault tolerance can be achieved at different levels.
Although NMR scheme is widely applied to construct highly reliable systems, it is
deslrsble that modu lar units have the capability of concurrent error detect ion &0
th at they can signal any fault occurrence. Since TSC circuitt possess this desirable
property, t hey have been intriguing many researchers. However, the design of TSC
circuits is still a pending problem. We hope that the design or TSC circuits could
be done as easily as that of common digital circuits. Thus, it is highly desirable
to develop a grou p of universal basic building blocks and formalize a set of design
methods for achieving T SC circuits.
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Figure 2.7: A general structure of TSCcircuit.
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Chapter 3
Principles of two-rail totally
self-checking checkers
3.1 P r eliminari es
3.1.1 Failure , fau lt , and e rror
When ap plied to digita l ,y~ lem" the term, of failu re, fa ull , and error have
different meaninll:s (3)-[61. (36).
Fa ilu r-e. Failure denot es inability of an element to perform its designed function
because of errors in t he clement or its environment , errors are in lurn eauecd by
various faults (361.
Fault : A fault is an anomalous physical condi tion which may or may noLcause a
failure. Causes include design errors, manufacturing problems, damage lali.!lllc, or
other deterioration and external dist urbances.
Error : An error is a manifestation of a fault in a system, il. which t he logical etete
of an clement differs from it, intended value [361.
A fault in a system does not necessarily TC. , U]t in an erro r. An error occur!
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only when a fault is llcnsitivc. A fault is referred to as latent if it has not yet
been sensitized in the system. T he term soft is often applied to er rors t hat persist
after t he originating fault disappears. Once corrected, soft er rors usuall y leave no
damage in the system.
3.1.2 Mo deling of fau lts
In general, t he effect of a fault is represented by means of a model, which
represents the change th at t he fault produ ces in circuit signals 13J-(6]. [36J.
Stu ck-a t-fault s: It assumes th at a rault in a logic gate resul ts in one of its inputs
or the output being fixed to eit her a logic 0 (stuc k-at-O) or a logic 1 (st uck-at-l).
T he st uck-at-fault model olTersgood representation for the most commo n types of
failures , e.g. ahor t-circui ta (shorts) and open -circuits (opens) in many technologies.
Bridging fa ult: A bridging fault occurs when two leads in a logic network are
connected accidentally and wirfd logic is performed at the connectio ns. Two types
of com mon bridging faults are inpu t bridging fault and feedback bridging fa ult.
St uck- o pen faul t s: Stuck-ope n faults are a peculieri ty cf CMOSdigital integrated
circuits; they are not equivalent to classical stuck-at faults. Th e major difference
between the stuc k-at faults and the stuc k-open faults is that the former leaves
the fau lty gate as a combinational circuit, but the latte r turn s it into a sequent ial
circuit.
The error modes which are possible to turn up can also be categorized into
symmetric errors and asymm et ric errors; independent bit errors and physically
clustered bit errors: transient faults or inte rmittently occurr ing bit -errors and per -
manent faults . Transient faults arc non-recurring temporary faults . Intermi tten t
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fault s are recurring faults that reappea r on a regular basis.
3.1.3 Totally self-che ck ing (TSC) concept
The concept of totally self-checking was first proposed by Carte r and Schneider
[I]. and was formally defined by Anderson and Metze [2], [7}as follows:
Definit ion 1 : A circuit is cod~-disjoint i/ it maps cod~ inpu lll illto co,j~ OUlpllb
and noncodc inputs into noncodr. outpu ts during fault -free operations.
Definiti on 2 .. A circuit is sel/ -testi llg i/ for every/ault from a prescribed .~ct, Ihe
circuit produces a non cede output for at least one code input
D efinition 3 : A circuit is /ault secure if for every fault from a prescr ibed set, l1Ie
circuit never produces an incorrect code au/put lor code input.~ .
D efin it ion 4 : A circuit is lotally sell-checking if it: is bolh self-Iest ing alld /ault
D efini t ion 5 : A circuit is a TSC checker i/ it is bolh code·disjoinl and lotally
self-checlt:ing.
TSC checkers are mainly used to monitor the outputs of TSC functional cir-
cuits and produce an error indicat ion when one or more ncncodc inputs arc received
or any internal fault from a prescribed set occurs. They can he ach ieved at dif -
ferent levels, such as transistor level [301, logic gate level (3]-[6J. functional unit
level [1l1-114) and system level [16]. They also can be implemented wit h differ-
ent technologies, such as NMOS/C MOS implementat ion (30), PLA implementation
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[41. combinational logic implementation [3J-16), and sequent iallogic implementation
[10).
Th ere have been many proposed TSC checkers which employ simple, useful. and
efficient codes such as Parity codes, Berger codes, m-out-of-n codes, Hsiao code.
lIamm ing codes, low-cost arithmetic codes. two-rail codes, etc. [3)- [61_
3.2 Two-rail (TR ) TSC checkers
T WO-T'f1il (TR) mean! Ihat each T R variable i5 represented by a pair of crdi-
nary variables. A Tn T SC checker is a TSC circuit whicb it! input variables and
output variables are two-rail variables [5].[6J. Each pair of TR variables has com-
plementary values during normal operation. A TR-TSC checker itself can be an
independent checker to monitor it TSC functional circuit . It also can be a part of a
TSC checker IS] . [61. (19]. One of ib useful functlons is of convert ing N erro r indi-
catio n variables into one error indicat ion variable for An observable error indication
out put. With this importa nt property. T R-TSC checkers, especially two-input two-
rail comparator N2(411. are olten used in designinKether useful TSC checkers. For
exam ple, A TSC Berger code checker which U5e5 TR-TSC cbeckers as its reduction
circuits (20] i5 shown in Flgure 3.1.
3.3 The design of TR-TSC checkers using two-
input two-rail com para t or N2
3.3_1 Tree struc tu re with maximum de pt h
Let C" denote a two-rail code with n bits and N" denote oil checker {or C".
In general, C" does not always contain 2" codewords. Checker N" has n pairs of
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c,
Figure 3.1: A TSC Berger code checker which uses T R·T SC checkers as its reductio n
circu its copied from Ref [20J.
inputs (Xil , Xi2) ( I $ i s: n) and a pair of output s (z l , z2). Inpu t (X;"X;2 ) and
output (zl, z2) arc represented by X; and Z, respectively. The prescribed sd of
faults are single st uck-at fau lts, which ar e on concern here. Any raulL in N. can be
transient . intermitt ent , or permanent (19].
A two-input h\ -o-rai l TSC com parator (411 is shown in Figure 3.2. It is a basic
T R· T SC block which is widely used to build oth er mu lt i-input TR·TSC checkere.
Let N, deno te thi s t wo-input TR-TSC compa rato r. If (01) repr esents logi c 0 and
(10) for logic 1 in normal condi tion , t he N, is equal to mod ulo-2 adder. Mulli-input
T R-T SC checkers can be implemented by in te rconn ecting N, to form multilevel
trees of arbit rary size (3}-[6J, 119). Fo r exam ple, a t ree with eight input variables
formed by inter connect ing seven N2 checkers is shown in Figure 3.3 .
Since each block ill fo\ult secure for ali un idi rectional multiple faults , and !leU-
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Figure 3.2: A two-input two-rail comparator N, [41 ).
testing provided that it receives the complete minimal test eet TS I. Thus, the
rCllulting circuit is a. TSC checker. Proofs for thc following theorems can be found
in 1191_
Theorem 1 (19/: Nn is a TR·TSC checker for Cn if and only if: i) every faull in
N.. is delected by some word in C,.; ii) d maps code inputs into code output" and
noncode inpllls into noncode outputs.
In general, 2n lest patterns are sufficient to diagnose such multiple-inpu t t rees if
each T R block has no more than n input pairs {I9]. However, all these patte rns may
not be applied to the mult iple-input tree circuit during normal opera tion. This is
because two-rail checkers are usually placed at the output of the circuit under check;
that is, they are embedded , and hence a restricted number of patt erns may begiven
to the checkers. Even for this situation, some techniques have been proposed that
IA complete minimal t~~ se~ (Ts ) consllta of n. T" T", and T4' where n = {(Ol) , (OI)),
T, = {(Oll , (I O)j, T" = {(I0),( OI)). and T4 = {(lOl,(IO)) ,
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sat isfy the self-testing condit ions 1191.
Theorem 2 [19]: Let all 0/ the 2" two-rail codewords be applied to N" which is
a tree circu it consisting 0/ only N2'so The number of codewords which give one
pattern from T5 on the two pairs of input fine 0/ every N1 in N,. is equal to 2"-2
(n 2: 2).
Theo rem 3 flY]: An y n.inpu t tree circuit consillt ing 0/ only N1 's is an TR-TSC
checker for C" i/ k 2:: (3 X2"-1 +1).
In case k < (3 X 2"-2 + I ), a circuit consisti ng of only N1's cannot always
becom e a T R-TSC checker . In this case, however, t he probabili ty t hat the circuit
is a TR- TSC checker is expec ted to be high [191.
T here are many other design met hods for const ructi ng TR -TSC checkers, such
as Tree Structure With Minima l Depth [19], Decision Graph Des ign 1191, and Auz.
Wary Inpu t Technique [42J. These design met hods have the ir par t icular adva ntagCll
[19), [,"].
3.4 The de sign of TR-TSC checker s with uni-
versal operator blocks
T R-TSC checkers can be achieved not only using N1's but also using universal
operator blocks [91, {1 1\- [16].
3.4 .1 'Two-element m orphic Boolean alge bra
T wo-element morphic Boolean algebra. was forma.lized by Carte r el al [91ami it
is t he theor et ical basis of the design of T R-TSC checkers using universal operato r
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blocks.
Wedeline:
(A) . The usua l Boolean algebra as:
8. =(O,I, I')}
where { *) is the set of usual logic operators.
(D) . The two-element Boolean algeb ra as :
8M = {{(elle2) . (el , c2)},{( C" C, ),
(' ''',)), (' M})
where {*M} is th e set of morphic logic operators.
We have th e morphism :
(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
Thi s morphism relates t he two-element Boolean algebra 8 M to the usua l Boolean
algebr a B,. and the correspondence between them is:
M(A i *M Aj) = M(A; ). M(A,i)
where A;, A; E ((O,O}, (O, 1),( 1,0) , (1, 1)) .
3.4.2 Factorizat ion t echnique
(3.4)
Car ter d al [91 proposed a set of unive rsa l ope rato r blocks consisting of t hree
basic blocks - MNOT, MAND, and MXOR blocks . T heir internal constructions
are shown in Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5. and Figure 3.6, respectively. They Icrmallzcd
a factorization technique consisting of three steps to achieve a TR·TSC checker
which implements any given morphic Boolean function using their proposed oper-
ato r blocks. These three ste ps are [91:
(a) Factorization step
Take the subpolynomial S consisting of the largest number of ter ms contain -
ing a common variable, eay Ai, and replace it by Ail (Pd, where PI is a Boolean
polynomial such that Ail (Pd == s.
Apply the above step recursively to the remaining terms of the polynomial G
until the remaining polynomial has no terms with variables in common.
(b) Parenthes is-removal step
If any Boolean polynomial within the innermost parenthesis has an odd number
of terms and is immediately followedby two right parentheses, then delete the cut er
parenthesis.
Apply (a) and (b) alternatively until ric more factorization or parenthesis re-
moval is possible.
(c) Complementation step
In the form which cannot be subjected to further factorization or parenthesis
removal, replace the subst ructure I + P by P' .
A self-tes ting structu re implement ing the morphic Boolean function is obtaine d
as follows from the final parenthesized form resulting from the above algorithm .
The comp lementa tion is implemented by MNOT block. The + is implemented by
MXOR block. The AND structure is implemented by MAND block.
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Theoretica lly, any arbitrary morpbic logic expression can be implemented by
TR-TSC checkers using these blocks and the factorization technique; therefore,
complex morphic logic expressions with multiple inputs and out puts are difficult
to implement since it is hard to t ransform given complex morphic logic expressions
into testab le st ructures of specified XQR-parenthesized forms under normal condi-
tions. The verification of the 9l~It·testing property for a developed morphic circuit
is difficult [9}.
A design example using Factorizat ion Technique to achieve a testab le structure
[91is described below. Let
G = At +AIA1 +A1AsAg +A,A ,A gA,o +
A7A ,AgA Il +A , A,A3A~As +AtA'lA. AsA,
Recursively applying Factorizalion Step and Pa~nthes i8·RemolJal Step, we have
Finally applying Complfmentalion Step, we have the expression as
Figure 3.7 is an implementa tion of the given expression.
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Figure 3.3: A eight-input two-rail code checker.
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~
Figure 3.4: A MNOT opera tor block.
ce
Figure 3.5: A MAND opera.tor block.
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~~
Figure 3.6: A MXOR operator block.
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Figure 3.7: A design examp le with Factorization Technique .
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3.4.3 Multiple error d etection TR-TSC checke rs
Until now, wehave discussed various methods for the designof T R·TSC check-
ers. Although they can deal with different ceses which have mult iple inputs , and
large amount, medium amount , all well as small amount of ccdewcrds for given
two-rail code C.., they are incapable of detecti ng multiple errors, As independent
TSC checkers, these TR·TSC checkers have no ability to locate fault sources but
indicate fault occurrence.
Based on the two-element Boolean algebra 8M, Gaitanis proposed a unlvcr-
sal set of TR·TSC operator blocks and formalized a general technique to design
multip le error detect ing T R-TSC checkers [111-[16\.
T he new universal set of opera tor blocks is composed of a single-error detecting
two-rail operator (SEOTR), an odd-pa rity two-rail operator(OPT R) , a condit ional
single-error detecting two-rail operator (C· SEOT R), and a dcuble-errcr detect-
ing two-rail operator (DEDTR). The combinat ional circuits which arc designed
using these blocks are TSC clrcuita if every internal fault propagates to a set or
observable out puts. In comparison with the previous set or operato r bloch, this
set can be easily used in implement ing complex morphic logic ex pressions. The
self-testing property or the resulti ng circuits can be easily proved with cyclic diag-
nostic sequences COS. The internal constructi ons or SEOTR, OPTR, C,SEDTR,
and DEDTR are shown in Figure 3,82 , Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and Figure 3.11,
respectively. (bJ
2SEDT R has the la me interniLI con.t ruction ll& N,
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figure 3.8: The st ructu re of SEDT R operator block.
Design of multi-input TR·TSC double-error chec kers
Suppose that we have an nl-input DEDT R checker with single and double error
indication outputs 5i l and Di l , and an n~.input DEDTR checker with single and
double error indication outputs 5;1 and n;1. Then, multi-inpu t DEDTR checkers
can be designed according to a recursive formula as follows [14J:
D;
5;
(3.5)
(3.6)
The modular structure or a multi-input TR-TSC double-error checker (14] is
shown in f igure 3.12.
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Design ormul ti- input T R·TSC mult i-error checkers
Let n two-rail inputs be denoted by Ai, i =1,2" ", II. Let II separate error
indication outputs be denoted by T:, e :;;; 1,2, " , n which ind icate up to e input
The multi·input TR·:'SC multi-e rror detec ting checkerscelled MEDTR checker
call be constructed according to the following recursive functions {151:
where t; > T:-1 •
r: +1;-1 + A' f 1
(3.7)
(3·'1
Since the TR·TSC multi-erro r detection checkers can provide multiple error
information , t hey are parti cularly useful end efficient in de~igning TSC SEC/DEn
circuits [111-[161.
3 .5 C on cl ud in g remarks
A TR ·TSC checkercan be an independent checker to monitor a TSC funct ional
circuit or a key part of another TSC checker. Various design tech niques are available
for the design for TR·TSC checkers. According to the struct ure of TR·TSC check-
ers, there are two main methods to design T R·TSC checkers. One is to use only
N2's to construct TR·TSC checkers. The other is to use universal operator blocks
to build TR·TSC checkers. Based on the functions of T R·TSC checkers, TR·TSC
checkers can also be classified to error-ind ication-only checkers and multiple erro r
detect ion checkers. Since TR·TSC multi-error detectio n checkers provide mult iple
error information, it brings new prospective applications for T R-TSC checkers.
The techniques discussed in tbi, chapter are not suita ble for the design of TR·
TSC functional circuits. In the rollowing chapters , we will introduce new t heories
And techniques to desillD TR·TSC funct ional circuits utin! universal set of basic
building block. (DIlB).
..
rtih'i ' •II ' i. ~ : :I 'y' i IU' I
\7 1
,.
': :' -":'1
I ..... !4 -....
Figure 3.9: The structure of QPTRoperator block.
Figure 3.10: The structure orC.SEDTR operator block.
,.
i"' " ....~
I ~ ;
Figure 3.11: The st ructu re or DEDTR operator block.
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Figure 3.12: The modular struct ure of a mult i-input TR·TSC double-error checker
(H).
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Chapter 4
Strong morphic Boolean algebra
an d a new classification of
ch eckers
Existing uni versa l sets of operator blocks are only suitable (or the design of T R·
TSC checkers [91. [111-[16), (19J which im plement conventiona l morphic funct ions
with err or indicati on variables. Convention al morphic Boolean algebra EM forma l-
izes two-clement morphic logic [9] for erro r indication variables; therefore , it does
not descr ibe ordina ry logic operatio ns of usual Boolean algebra E.. unde r normal
condition. T hus, t he theories and methods of the design ofTR·TSC checkers using
existing universal sets of operator blocks can not be directly applied to TR ·TSC
functio nal circuits. The design of TR ·TSC functional circuits is st ill based on t rial
and error. For example, a T R·TSC full adder (FA) [31] is shown in Figure 4.1. Thi s
TR -TSC adde r has been successfully achieved; now, how about th e next des ign tas k
for another T R-TSC funct ional circuit? Consequent ly, it is necessary to establish
new theory and provide simp le, convenient and systematic des ign techniques for
the design of TSC circuit" especially for TSC Iunct ion al circuits.
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,,-- - --L_-"
}------ .,,'
Figure 4.1: A two-rail TSC full adder copied from Rd 131].
4 .1 Stro ng morphic B ool ean a lgebra (Bs~t)
Two-element morphi c Boolean illgeb ra 8M discussed in SeclioJl 3.~. J fOrluali%.Cll
two-element morphic logic for error indication. In 8"" (01) and (10) are equlvalem
for normal state; (00) and (11) are equivalent (or b.ult stale. There is no difference
between (OI) and (10) under norma.!condition. Thi s leads that 8u docs not con-
duct ordinar y logic operations of usual Boolean algebra D..under normal condition.
In order to overcome the limitation s of 8M. we int roduce a new Boolean algebra
called two-element strong morp hic Boolean algebra 8 5M .
We define IWQ·e/cmenl stro'lg morp hic Doolean algebro all:
where et , ea = 0 or I , {.nf} is a set of strong morphie logic cperer crs.
·19
The stro ng morphism is formalized as:
(4.2)
(4.3)
1M - morphic logic I for normal state; OM- mcrphic logic 0 for fault state ; 1 -
usual logic 1, 0 - usua l logic O.
This new morphism relates the strong morphic Boolean algebra B SM to usual
Boolean algebra B". The correspondence between t hem is:
where Ai and A j are two-element error indication variables, { . M} is a set of oper-
a tors in 0/11, and {. } is a set of operators in B".
De finit ion 6 : The slate space and operators.SM ,
form /I lJoolean algebra termed strong morphicBoolean algebra.
Theor em 4 : There is a naturalcorrespondencebetween function8g(a\ , a2, ' " ,a,,)
jn B Oo:: to, I, {.n,and functionsG(AhA2," ' ,A,, ) in B 5M .
Proof: For any logic operation from {*') of 8" , tbre exists one and only one
operation from {. 5M} in 85M. This correspondence is given in (4.4). Consequently,
the natural correspond ence between B" and 85M exists.
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The most promin ent advant age of BSM is tha t it relat es the state (01) of two-
element variable to usual logic 0 and (10) to usual logic 1 while it still pOSS('Mes all
th,. properties of 8M .
The natural cor respondence between B.. and BSMonly formalizes the behaviour
of 8 SM in ih intrinsic st ate apace - code apace. T he ex tr inllkstllte apace - noncode
space also needs investigation.
4.2 A new classification of checkers
According to t he conventional definiti on, a circuit is ca lled a checker irit maps
code inputs into code outputs and noncode inputs into noncode outputs duri ng
fault-free operation. However, thi s definition is not enough to describe the nntl re
properties of TSC checkers in a T SC space. We should st udy the TSC space and
give a new class ifica tion of checkers.
4 .2.1 A TSC state spa ce
A TSC space is associated with two spac es - input space 4Jand output space
11' . The inpu t space 4Jconsists of code space 4Jc and noncode space cflnc. The output
space 11' consists of code space ~c and noncode space + nc. That is
cfl =:: ~c U4lnc
~ =:: ~c Ulpnc
~ . can be furt her distinguished by ~c1 and 'I'd . That is
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(1.6)
(4.7)
INPUT SPACE
1IJ
V / / 1/ .· ;....1~/~<,We":-:
~
OUTPUT SP,\CE
Figure 4,2: A TSC state space,
where ~ Ol stands for correct code output space during normal operat ion and ~ el'
which i~ generated by noncode inp uts, for incorrect code out pul space (disregarded
rode space). Thus, ~e = ~c1 (lJtd is null) when inputs are code word s; w~ is ~~<,
or equals 10 l!Id ( l!I., is null) when inputs are noncode words. iliel an d lIIe1 cannot
co-l'x i ~t as non-null sets.
'l'he TSC sla te space is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.2.2 A new classification of che ckers
Let X. Y, Z represent two-element erro r indica tion variables, and X, Y for
inpul variables, Z for outpu t vari able. Based on the part ition of TSC space and
the behaviours of a checker in intrin sic and extrinsic state spaces, we define the
following five types of checkers.
Ty pe I checker
Type I checker is the eenventional checker. The for mal definilion is giv('n M:
De finition 7 : A checker is a Type I checker if and only if;
i) ~Vh en X , Y € $ e, then
X, Y .2.!..Z "" G,(X, }' ) E $ d (LS)
i i) When either X E e, and Y E ¢Inc or X € $ M and Y € $ . 0' · X, Y E <line, /llell
X.}'~ Z = O,(X, n E 'line
G, - Type I mapping.
T ype II ch ecker
Type II checker is defined as:
Defini tion 8 : A cherker is a Type lJ eheckr.r if and only if ;
i) When X, Y E $ . , Ihen
X, y :!.!.!. z = CuP<,Y ) E \lid
ii) When either X E $ . and Y E $ ne or X € $ ... and I" E $ e, then
X, y /?J!.. Z = GIl( X, Y ) E $ ...
ii i) When bolh X, Y E $ "", then
X, y {l..!J. Z = G/f (X, Y ) E $ .2
GlI - Type II mapping.
('1.9)
(' ,10)
(' ,II )
(' ,12)
Type [II checker
Type III checkeris defined as:
Definiti on 9 : A chte A:cris a Type III ched cr i/ anJ only i/ it m ccu :
i) When X. Y E • •• thcn
X,y!!.!..u Z :::: G",(X, Y) E '1'.. (U 3)
ii) Whcn tilhcr X E e, and Y E . ... or X E . ... and Y E . c, or ~oth X. Y e .~. ,
thrn
x,y!!.!..u Z = GIIl (X ,Y ) E '1'.2
Gill - TyPc 111mflpping.
Type IV checker
Type IV checker is defined as:
Defin iti on 10 : II chtcktr if G Twe IV ched :cr if (lnd onty :/ :
i) When X, Y E • •, then
X,Y !!.!!. Z :::: GtvI X ,Y) E 1'..
ii) When r ilhcr X E +c (lnd Y E 40... or X E <fine lind Y E . c, thcn
X,Y f!,!..!. Z = Grv( X ,Y ) E t c2
ii i) When bolh X, Y E .... , then
X ,Y f!,!..!. Z =Grv( X, Y ) E 'Ii..c
G, V - Type IV mapping.
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(U4)
(U5)
(4.16)
(4.17)
Type V checker
T ype V checkers are conditio nal checkers which have condi tional input s and
non-conditional inputs . We still conside r two inputs case. Type V checker is dcflued
Definition 11 : A checker is a Type V checker if and only if :
i) When X. Y E ~c , then
X, Y~ Z= Gv (X,Y) E IJrd
i i) Let X be a conditit;JJlflI input,
(a) Wh en X E tJle • }' E ¢I"" . thell
x,Y "£!::'Z '" Gv(X, r') E IJr n•
(6) When X E ¢Inc , Y E til• . then
iii) Sim ilflrly, let Y be a conditiona l input,
(a) ~Yhc n X E tJln• , Y E 41. , thcn
X,Y ~ Z", Gv( X, Y) E 1Jr".
(b) Wh en X E 41" , Y E ¢l". , then
x,Y~ Z '" Gv(X, Y) E IIr c~
iv) When both X, Y E <fine' then
X, Y ~ Z'" Gv(X, Y} E lJr e~
G ,... - Type IV map ping.
(-1.18)
(1.19)
(1.201
(1.11)
(1.22)
(1.2:1)
According to the new definit ions above, for two-inpu t case, we know that Type
I checkers are error -input sensitive (EIS) checkers, Ty pe II checkers are error-i nput
sem i-sensitive (E ISS) checkers, Type III checkers are errc r-lnput insens itive (EllS)
checkers , Ty pe IV checkers are double -crror· input sensitive (DCrS) checkers, and
TYIlI~ V checkers are conditional erro r-inpu t sensitive (CE IS) checke rs.
All five types of checkers can be used in designing var ious TSC checkers to
ach ieve mult iple error detection . But only Type I, Type II and Type III checkers
are efficient for buildi ng various T SC functional circuits. Type IV and Type V
chckers arc very useful for constructi ng TSC checkers but their applicat ions in TSC
funct iona l part remai n unclea r.
4 .3 A group of s t r on g morphic basic operations
in BS M
We have formalized a slrong mcrphic Boolean algebr a BSMan d a new cleesl-
ficat ion of checkers. Here, we propose a group of strong mor phic bas ic operatio ns
which implements three basic functions - XORSM, ANDsMant! ORSM. According
to the new classification of checke rs, we develop t hree ty pes of basic: ope ra tions for
eac h basic functi on. f or XORS M basic function , we define XORSMI>XORSM1 and
XORSM3 operations; for ANDsM, we define ANDsM1lANDsM1 and ANDsM3oper-
at ions; for ORsM, we define ORSMIt ORSM2, and ORSM3 operat ions. T hese thre-
types ope rations correspond \..>Type I, Type II , and Type III checkers, respect ively.
4.3 .1 Strong morphic 'Op erat ors
We define a st rong morph,c operator as:
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Defi nition 12 : tin opera/oris a strong morphic operalorij and only ij i/ pOS$eMU
the following two properti es:
• 1t implemenls 11 nlliurnl correspondence belween 85 M aud Hu in the inlfin,.it
• 1t[un ctions II,. one oj chukcrs among Type I, Type IJ lind Type 111 duckcr8
We use the symbol {. p:,rJ to stand f"r " group of morphic operators, • for
a nat ural correspondence between H"\f (or 11,.,) and Bu , amI P for the type of
morphic operator , l.e.• when Pis SM, it is a st rong morphic operator. and it is a
conventional morphic operator when P is M. N E {1,2,3,oI,5}, and it indicates 10
which type of checker does the operator belong, For example, fD s M 3 means that
this operator is a strong morphic Type IiI XORoperator - a EIIS-XORope rator,
4.3 .2 Strong morphic basi c op er at ions
We define a operation which involves only two variables as a basic operation.
Accordi'J to the definition of st rong morphic operators, we propose three basic
strong morphic functions - XOR, AND and OR - which give three nat ural cor-
respondences between 8SM and Bu in the intr insic state space. These natural
correspondences are given in Table 4,1. They implement the following basic Iunc-
lions:
E =A $SMB
C= A ·SM B
D= A+SMB
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("")
("")
(' .26)
Table 4.1: Th ree basic SM operations in intrin sic:space.
Input A Input D ANDsM C ORsA! D X ORS.lf E
A , A, 0, 0 , C, C, 0, 0, E, E,
011 01 '
0 I 0 ,
11
,
o , , 0 0 I , 0 0
, 0 o I 0 I , 0 0
, 0 I 0 , 0 I 0 I
IJl the intrinsic state space, these th ree basic funct ions cen implement any given
combin a-ion al logic:function.
For ' !;k. l l);l.~ic function, we forma lize thr ee basic operations - . SMb ' SM2 and
• .n l l. T hus, WC' have formalized nine st rong morphic basic operations as
Group 1: XORSMh A:"l'DsMioORsM1;
Group 2: XORSM2, ANDsM2. ORSM2;
Group .3: XORsMJ, ANDsMJ. and ORSMJ'
In intr insic slat e space, all the se three groups implement t he basi c funct ions
which a rc defined in Table 4.1. In ext rinsic sta te space, t hey work like T ype I,
Type II, and Type III checkers, respec ti vely. These are illust rated in Table 4.2,
Ta ble ·1.3, and Table ·1.4, respect ively.
4.4 Co ncluding remarks
We have proposed a new Boolean algeb ra - strong morph ic Boolean algebra
llsA!. Thi s new Boolean algebra overcomes the disadvant age of conventional mer-
phic Boolean algebra 8 M which is incapab le of providing natu ral correspondence
between lJ.u and 11... While possessing all the properties of EM, BSMalso provides
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Table 4.2: The three basic 5Ml operation ill extr insic space.
Table -1.3: The th ree bas ic 5J1,I2 opera tion ill cXlrinsir space.
Table 4.4: The three basic 5M3 operation in ext rinsic space.
Input A Input 13
(00) (11) (X X)
(XX) (00)/(11)
(00)/ (11) (00) ' (111
a natural correspondence between 8 SM and By. We have given a. new clessifice-
tion for checkers. Five types of checkers have been defined. These five types of
checkers formalize various behaviours of different checkers. Thr ee st rong morphic
1Jil-~ ic funct iolls and coereapondlng nine basic operatio ns have been rormali zed. T his
"hapler provides a theororical basis for developing universal TSC BOBs and design-
ing TIl -TS C circuits, especially for TSC functional circuits . Based on the t heory
presented, we will develop new groups ol£ universal TR-TS C BBBs and provide
(l('!j ign techniques of TR·TS C circuits using new T R-TSC BBE s.
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Chapter 5
Two-rail totally self-checking
basic building blocks
Based 011 st rong morphic Boolean algebra and the new classificat ion of che-k -
era, th ree types of basic build ing blocks (BB O) have been developed in this rh.ip-
ter. These three types of DBB, are error-Input sensitive BOns, error-in put semi-
sensitive BOBs, and error-inpill insensitive BOBs. Each type includes 1IJr(~ basic
function blocks - At'D BOB, OR BOB, and XOR BOD. Using these throe basic
funcuon blocks one can implement any given combinationallogic function. P rope rly
using d illc-enr types of BBBs, various TR-TSCcircuits which have t he capab ility
of confining internal faults in separate areas ran he achieved. In add ition, we also
present ano ther set of universal BRBs called TR-TSC multi-functicn (MF) BOBs,
T he appli cations of BBBs will he described in Chapter 6.
5.1 T R-T SC error-in put sensit ive (EIS) basic
building blo cks
TR -TSC error-input sensiti ve (EIS) BDBs implement a group of extrinsic sen-
sitive st rong rnorphlc Boolean basic cp-rancns - XORSMhANDs M h and ORSMI
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-- which have been defined in Chapter,j. TR -TSC EIS BBBs are composed of
three TR-TSC fiBDs - TR-TSC EIS-XOR BBB , T R-TSC EIS-AND BBB, and
TR · TSC EIS-OR BBB. Thesc BBBs are Type I checkers.
5 .1.1 T R -TS C EIS -XOR basic building block
The proposed structure of TR-TSC ElS-XOR 8 8 131 is shown in Figure 5.1.
It is a ron ventio nal two-Input two-variab le comparator. Tabl e 5.1 gives its truth
tab le. It implemen ts the following basic ope ration:
E= A ffisMI B
Any single inte rnal fa\llt can be test ed by the minimal tes ting set Ts:
(5.1)
(5.2)
where 1', ~ " 01).10111.1', ~ {(OI).(l OIl .1', ~ {(to),IOlll , and 1', = {('O),(IOIl .
Par example, ( I) . Suppose that a st uck-at-O fault occurs at gate-2 , it s oup tut
keeps cor rect value when its input vecto r is T2 or T3 or T~ ; it indicates the fault by
(00) when its input is TI • (2). Suppose t hat the re is a etuck-et -I fault at gete-t, it
keeps correct outputs when its inputs arc T1 and T3; it will give the fault ind ication
when it receives th e input which is eith er T1 or T~ by {l l}. The verifications for
the test of stuck-at faults follow the similar procedures , and here are omitted.
T he o r em 5 : The proposed EfS·XDR BBB is a TR-TSC BBB.
Proof: ltsJault secureand atlJ-testingprope rties are illust rated in A.l- A.6. It
either keeps the cor rect value or gives an er ror indic ation at it s output E when any
l ilAinterna l oonst ruetlon i! the eame as SEDTR
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Table 5.1: The truth table or TR·TSC EIS·XQR BBU.
l: " It ·~ ~I'L
F¥¥:kif~",;I~I,,?~*_~~._~ _ .*- ~ :~~: ~r- " :.: . -~
u II 111 :1 1 i ll !
() I 'I , I . II I
I) u toil 11 , IF.b':=c=io=j~¥.~~J-~:;' ~~:.;- -:~T :I ~/ -~ '"I
1\ lJ 11 '.11 LI
I 111 :1 j ! I I
:: \l :: !I "' I ',' I
f-+.-+-,;-+-,<-J-+..i\-i;-7.-::ll]~ I,.Ii j
a \I \1 ' II -irl
I I lJ () II u ' I ) :I I
U I) j '1 1I (I ~'I II I II !, ....:.....L....'--'--"....L...!..-.L:_' _l_~!l1-L.!..._ . ;
singleinternal stuck-at fault occursdurinl normal operation; it pOSSC9SCS '.he fllllit
secureproperty. Since any singleinternal stuck-at fault can be tested by at least
one testing vector T; E Ts when Ts is applied to its inputs. the sclj.leslill9 property
is also preserved. Consequently, the proposed EIS-XQR i~ it. TR·TSC BBO. a
5.1.2 T R·TSC EIS· AND basic build ing block
The proposed st ructure ofTR·TSC EIS·AND BBBisshownin Figure 5.2. The
proposed EIS-AND BBBimplements the following basicoperalion:
C ; A 'S M1B (5.3)
Besides its main functional output C. it hallanother output E which implements
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Ta.ble 5.2: The truth table of TR-TSC EIS·AND BBB.
o I U I 0
U I I u I
I U f) I I
I l} J 0 0
II I f) Il 0
II J I J t
o u 0 I 0
I I 0 I J
I (J 0 0 I}
J 0 I 1 I
U () I u 0
I I I I} I
DUO 0 u
o 0 I I 0
I 1 0 0 0
1 1 I I 1
II TOT--u-l
I i ti l u I
" I O U i
I I" " iII 1J U I
I I I I
~ ~ r: i
() !l U I
11 0 o
o 0 n
I Il II I
XORsM I operation. H is an EIS-XORfunction outpu t.
Its truth ta.ble is given in Table 5.2.
Theorem 6 : The proposed EIS-AND BBB is II TR·TS C BBB.
Proof: Its fault secureand sel/-testingproperties are illustrated in A,7 - A,16.
The rest oCthe proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently, the proposed EIS·
AND is a TR-TSC BBB.
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5.1.3 TR-TSC EIS-OR basic build ing block
The proposed str ucture of TR ·TSC EIS-OR BBB is shown in Figure 5.3. The
proposed EIS-OR BBB implements the following basic operation :
D =A +5,111B (5"1)
Besides its main funct ional outp ut D, it bas another out put E which implements
XORSMI operation. It is an E1S-XOR funct ion output.
Its trut h tab le is given in Table 5.a.
Th eorem 7 : The proposed EIS-OR HBD is a TR-TSC 8 8 8 .
Proof: Its fault ser.l.lreand self-testing proper t ies are illustrated in A.17- A.26.
T he rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequenlly, the pro posed EIS-
OR is a TR·TSC BBB. o
5.2 TR-TSC error-input semi-sensitive (EISS)
basic building blocks
TR.TSC error-input semi-sensitive (E1SS) BBBs implement a group of cxtrin-
sic semi-sensitivestrong morphic Booleanbasic operations - XORsM2, ANDsM 2.
and ORSM 2 - which havebeendefinedin Chapter •. TR·TSC EISSBDDsare com-
posedof three TR·TSC BDDs - TR·TSC EISS-XOR BBB, T R·TSC EISS-AND
BBB, and TR·TSC EISS-OR BDB. These BBBs are Type II checkers.
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Table 5.3: T he t ruth table ofTR·TSC EIS-OR BBB.
Input A lnnut B
!Il A
5.2.1 TR-TSC EISS-XOR bas ic bu ilding block
The proposed structure of TR -TSC EISS-XOR BBB is shown in Figure 5.1.
The proposed EISS·XOR BBB implements the following basic operation:
E=A EDSM2B
Its t ruth table is given in Table 5.4.
Th eorem 8 : The proposed EfSS·XOR DDBis a TR-TSC DBB.
(5.5)
Proof: Its fault secure and self-testing properties are illustra ted in B.1 and
B.2. The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently, the proposed
EISS·XOR is a TR ·TSC BBB.
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Ta.ble 5.4: T he tru th table of TR·TS C ElSS-XOR BBB.
Inp ut A ' nplll B OU1PlII E
A , A, 8 , 8, E, F:J
0 I 0 I 0 I I0 I 1 0 1 0I 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 I 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 I I 1
0 0 0 I 0 0
I 1 0 1 1 I
I 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 I
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 I 1 I 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
5.2.2 TR-TSC EIS S-AND bas ic building block
T he proposed st ruct ure of TR-TSC EISS·AN D BBB is shown ill.fi B: 5.5. The
proposed EISS·AND BBB implements th e foilowinB: basic operat ion:
(5.6)
Besides its m ain funct ional out put C, it bas anothe r outp ut E which implements
XORsM10perati on. It is An EISS-XOR function output .
Its t ruth tab le is given in Tab le 5.5.
T heorem 9 : The proposed ElSS·AND BBB &. G TR·TSC BBB.
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Table 5.5: The truth tab le of TR-TSC EISS-AND BBB.
Proof: Its fault secure and self-testing properties are illustra ted in B.3 - B.8.
The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently , the proposed.ErSS·
AND is a TR-TSC BBB.
5.2 .3 TR-TSC EISS-OR bas ic building block
The proposed structure of TR-TSC EISS-OR BBB is shown in Figure 5.6. The
proposed EISS-OR BBB implements the following basic operat ion:
D=A+S M 2B (5.7)
Besides its main functional output D, it haa anothe r output E which implements
XORSM2operation . It is an EISS-XOR function output .
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Tahle 5.6: The truth table of TR ·TSC ErSS-OR BBB.
Input A Input B Output E Output D
A, .1, B, n, £1 1~1 o, o,
0 I o I 0 I 0 I
u I I 0 I o I
"I 0 0 I I 0 I o
I 0 I 0 o I I {]
0 I 0 o 0 n n 0
0 I I I I I I I
0 0 o I 0 0 0 0
I I 0 I I I I I
I 0 0 o I I I I
I 0 I I 0 0 I I
0 0 I 0 I I I I
I I I 0 0 n I I
0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I
0 0 I I I 0 I 0
[ I 0 o I 0 I 0
[ [ [ [ 0 I I 0
Its truth table is given in Table 5.6.
Theorem 10 : The proposed EISS-OR BBB is a TR-TSC BBB.
Proof: Its fault secun: and self-testing proper ties are illustrated in B.9 - B.14.
The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem S. Consequently, the proposed EISS-
OR is a TR-TSCBBB.
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o
5.3 TR-TSC error-input insensitive (EllS) basic
building blocks
TR· TSC error-input insensitive (Ell S) BBBs implement a group of ext rinsic
insensit ive strong morphic Boolean basic operations - XORSM3, ANDs M 3, and
ORSM 3 - whichhave beendefinedin Chapter -I. TR-TSC EllS BBBs are composed
of three TR-TSC BBBs - TR·TSC EIIS-XOR BBB, T R-TSC EllS-AND DBB,
and TR-TSC EllS-OR BBB. These BBBs are Type m checkers.
5 .3.1 TR-TSC EIIS- XO R basic building blo ck
Proposed structure of TR-TSC EIIS·XOR BBB is shown in Figure 5.7. Th e
proposed EIIS-XQR BBB impleme nts the following basic opera t ion:
(S.8)
Besides its main fundional outpu t E., it has three other outputs - E. C, and
D. E is an EISS-XOR function out put which implements XORSM1 operat ion; C
is an EISS-AND function output which implements ANDsM1 operation; D is an
EIlS·OR function outp ut which implements ORSM3 operation.
Its truth ta ble is given in Table 5.7.
Theorem 11 : The pf()posed EIlS-XOR BBB is a TR-TSC BBB.
Proof: Its fault secureand sd/-testing prope rties are illustra ted ill C.l - C.26.
T he rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently, t he proposed Ell S-
XOR is a T R-TSC BBD.
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Table 5.7: The tr ut h table of TR-TSC EIIS-XOR BBB.
lnput A Input B Outmu E OUtllill C (Iur put D Outpu t f -
A, A, IJ, Ih £1 e. r, (', n, o, J;- i:'i....J
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 II 1 0
']U 1 1 U 1 U U 1 1 0 1 "1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 "1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
,!.=
"
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 U 1
"U 1 1 1 0 Il 1 1 1 0 1
II 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 o 1 \ 1 0 I
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
I 0 I I I 1 1 I I 0 0 1
0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 0
1 I I 0 I I 1 I I 0 0 1
0 U II 0 0 I 1 0 I 0 I Il
0 0 I I I 0 0 I 1 0 I
"1 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 1 0 I 0
I 1 I I 0 1 II I U I 1 0
When Ts is applied to its inputs, every single internal st uck-at fault is reflected
at its main output E· for at least one testing vector To e Ts except the single
stuck-at faults at gate 1 and gate 2 which are indicated at E and C.
5.3.2 TR-TSC EllS-AND basic b uilding block
The proposed st ructure of TR-TSC EllS-AND BBB is shown in Figure 5.8.
The proposed EllS-AND BBB implements the following basic operation:
C = A · SM3B (5.9)
Besides its main functional output C, it has two other outputs - E and D. E
is an EISS·XOR funct ion output which implements XORSM 2 operat ion; D is an
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Table 5.8: The t ruth ta ble of TR ·TSC EIIS-AND BDB.
Input A Input B Ou tput E (11111l111 D i 011111111 C
..II Al 11, 11, 1:.\ I ':~ IJ, o. Ii ( '1 .:
0 I 0 I 0 I u
I Fl ']0 I I " I u ! I II i ll II , u I I n I I I! 11 I
I n I u 0 I I I II 1 II
0 I ~ '; I " n n n I' :: 1:=IJ I I I I I
0 0 0 I 11 0 IJ IJ I n II I 0 I I I I I n I
I 0 0
"
I I I I o I
I 0 I I 11 u I I I n
0 0 I 0 I I I I
, " I
-+- I I 0 11 , I : liT
u
0 0 0 0 0 I n
I
I
IJ 0 I I I II I 1I H I
I I 0 0 I IJ I (J u I
I I I I 0 I I II I IJ
EISS·OR function outpu t which implements ORSM~ operation.
Its truth table is given in Table 5.8.
'Phe crem 12 : The proposed E/lS·AND BBB is a TR-TSC BBB.
Proof: Its fault 8 CCUI't and sel/-testing propert ies a re illustr ated in C.27- C.35.
T he rest of the proof is similar to in T heorem 5. Consequently, t he proposed EllS·
AND is a T R-TSC BBB.
When Ts is applied to its inputs, every single interna l st uck-at fault is reflected
at its ma.inout put C for at least one tes ting vectorTi E Ts except the single stuck-at
faults at gate 1 and gate 2 which are indicated at E.
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Table 5.9: The truth table ofTR·TSC EllS-OR BBB.
Input A Input B Output E Ou tputC OU1Pllt 0
A . A , 11, 1J'1 £1 IJ IJ
tJ I 0 I 0 I I
U J I II I II 0 I I 0
I 0 0 I I II tJ I I 0
J U I u U I I II J 0
o I ~ iJ I I I I I 0
0 J I I 0 0 I I 0 I
II 0 0 I I I I I I 0
I J 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I
I 0 0 II 0 tJ 0 tJ I 0
I 0 J J I I I I J tJ
0 0 I tJ tJ II tJ II I U
I I J II I J I I I 0
0 0 U tJ tJ I I tJ I tJ
0 0 I J I II 0 I I 0
J I tJ U J II tJ I J 0
J I I J 0 I tJ I 0 J
5.3 .3 TR-TSC EllS-OR basic b uilding block
Proposed str ucture of TR·T SC EJlS·OR BBB is shown in Figure 5.9. The
proposed EIIS-OR BBB implements the followingbasic operation:
D=A +SM 3B (5.10)
Besides itt main functional output 0 , it has two other outputs - E and C. F.
is an EISS·XORfunction output which implements XORSM2 operation; C is an
EISS·AND function output wh".h implements ANDsM2 operati on.
Its tru th table is given in Table 5.9.
Th eorem 13 : The proposed Ell S-OR BBB is a TR-TS C BBB.
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Proof: 119fauUsecure and self-testing properties are illustrated in C.36 - C.H .
The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5, Consequently, the proposed ElIS-
OR is a TR-TSC BBB.
When Ts is applied to ib inputs, every single internal stuck-at fault is reflected
at its main output D for at least one testing vector Ti E Ts except the single
stuck-at faults at gate 1 and gate 2 which are indicated at E.
5.4 TR-TSC Multi-function (MF) basic build-
ing blocks
A universal set of TR-TSC MF BBBsJ43}is proposed here. This set of BBDs
implements the funct ions of the morphic basic operations formalized by Gaitanis
[111-[ 161 and some strong morphic basic operations described in Chapter .j, 11
consists of a TR-TSC MF-OR BBB, a TR-TSC MF-AND BBB, aDlll a T R-TSC
MF-XOR BBB. TR-TSC MF-OR BOB incorporates the other two MF BOBs -
MF-AND BBB and MF·XOR BOB. It is a multi-type checker which includes Type
I, Type II, Type IV, and Type V functions. TR-TSC MF-AND BBB is a Type I
checker, and TR-TSC MF-XOR BBB is a Type H checker,
5.4.1 TR-TSC MF-OR basic building blo ck
TR-TSC MF-OR BBB is multi-function BBB. It provides all the functions
of the morphic basic operations formalized by Gaitanis fl l]-[ 16] and some strong
morphie basic operations described in Chapter.j. These functions are:
D := A+M4B
D· A+SM I8 (5.11)
(5.12)
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Table 5.10: The truth table of T R·TSC MF·OR BBB.
~~!r:: ~ ;:.~'I;' ; ~\:~i'~~ ·~.'~I: ~.""K~~: ·-~T':. I' ; r;;~i'(~; ~ ,~ : :;.! ~?Mf~~l l~M!';: :
II I . I . ~ • II I • ~ I " II , • , II I ., I I • I ' 0 8 I I I 0 .
1 > .I-il :·I"'"·~l lll' l "I 'I" llQD I+': ~_~ .:t:;~ ._~~~~ :!- ~ r~ .+1+hl, I ~ 1: ~
D' A + .\.13 B (5.13)
C A esMt B (5.14)
C' A eMI B (5.15)
E A ffisM2B (5.16)
E' AffiM2B (5.17)
F' A+MSB (5.18)
The internal ccnetructicn of TR·TSC MF·OR BBB is shown in Figurll! 5.10 and
its tru th ta ble is givcn in Table 5.10.
Thecrea, 14 : The prG.,o8ed TR MF·OR BBB i$ /! TSC BBB.
Proof: Its j /!ult seeure and 8elj-lts l ing propert ies are illustrated in D.l - D.52.
The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently, the proposed TR
MF·OR BBB is a TSC BBB.
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c
For example, assume t hat th ere is a atuck-at-I fault at th e output of gate li in
type 2 block. This fault can be teste d by T'l' T3 E T.. and will be indicated at its
output Do by (OO) (t he outp uts - D' and D also indicate this faul t) . U the output
of gate 2 has a st uck-at -O fault in type 2 block, this fault can be tested by Tt and
only indicated at its output C' by (00).
When Ts is applied to its inputs, eve ry single interna l st uck-at fault is reflected
at its main output D' for at least one tes t ing vector T; E Ts except the single stuck-
at-Il fault at gate 2 which is only indicated at C'. T hus, the output C' also has to
be moni tored when using TR· TSC MF·OR BBBs to building TR -TSC circuits.
5 .4.2 TR-TSC MF-AND basi c building block
The inte rna l construction of TR-TSC MF-AND DBB which im plements
is shown in Figu re 5.11.
c
C·
A 'S M1B, (5. 19)
(5.20)
Theore m 15 : The proposedTR MF-AND BBB is a TSC BB8.
Proof: Its fault secureand self-testing properties are illust rated in 0 .1 - 0 .23.
T he rest of th e proof is similar to in Theo rem 5. Conseque ntly, t he proposed TR
MF- AND BBB is a TSC BBB. a
For example, assume that the output of gate 4 has a atuck-at-Il fault, t his fault
can be tested by T\. The outp uts C' and C indicate th is fault by (00) and (II )
respe ct ively.
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5.4.3 TR-TSC MF·XOR basic building block
T he inte rna l construction of TR-TS C MF· XOR BBB which implements
E = A EBSM2B.
E' A ll'lM3B
is shown in Figure 5.12. $ M3 is the odd-parity operation [111-(161.
Theorem 18 : The proposed TR MF·XOR BBB i& d TS C BBB.
(5.21)
(5.22)
Proof: 119fault secureand sel/·testingproperties are illust rated in 0.40 - 0.48.
The rest of the proof is similar to in Theorem 5. Consequently, the proposed TR
MF-XOR BBB is a TSC DBB. o
For examp le, assume that the out put of gate 2 has a etuck-at-t fault ; this fault
can be tested by Tt lT2 € T. and will be indicated at its outpu t E by (00) and (11)
respect ively.
5.5 Comparisons of four sets of TR-TSC basic
building blocks
Table 5.11 list! the number of logic gates used in different BBBs. It also gives
the gate levels in the BBBs.
In compa rison with TR·TSe EIS BBBs and TR·TSC EllS BBBs, TR·TSC EIS
BBBs use less hardware and has a iewer gate levels; howevere, they are not widely
used in designing TR·TSC circuits . TR·TSC EIS BBBs and TR·TSC EllS BBBs
have acceptable number of gates and gate levels. They are the most useful BBBs
in building TR·TSC functional circuits while they also can be applied to the design
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Table 5.11: The table of companlOnJ of different BOBs.
! TYPE OF BLOCKS II AND/OR I XOR/ XOR 11nwrler BTotal Gall'S NGate I ,t' \·d~ g
EIS-XOR G • • u
,
EIS·A~D s , 0 I. a
EIS-OR s 2 0 rn ,
J:;ISS·XOR •
,
•
, ,
EISS-AND , , • G
,
[ ISS·OR , ., • n ,
EIIS·XOR , •
, 13 ,
EIIS·AND , G 1 , ·1
EllS-OR , 6 1 , ,
EXOR BBB •
,
•
, ,
AND DOD , , • "
.,
OR nBB
"
1·1 • 'll i 6
of TSC checkers. TR·TSC MF BOBs possess the functions of both the morphic
eesic operat ion! proposed by Ilaltanis (llj-{16 j and some st rong morphic basic
operations described in Chaplt r 4; therefore, they cost much hardware and have
more gate levels. Thus, they are only suitable for cues which have modular cell
structure,
5.6 Concluding remarks
We have proposed four eets of universal TR·TSC DBBs - TR-TSC EIS B8 o s,
TR·TSC EISS BBB!, TR ·TSC EllS BBB!, and TR·TSC MF BBB!. These BOB,
can be used in building TR·TSC circuits which implement any given combinat ional
logic Iunction. Since EIS BBBs end EIIS BBBs possess useful properties, they
are essential for designing TR·TSC functional circuits. This will be discussed in
Chapter 6.
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When EllS BBBs are used in building TR·TSC functional circuits, both main
{unction outp uts and outpu t E have to be monitored because single stuck-at faults
at gate 1 and gate 2 are only reflected at the output E.
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A I -r---~r',
A 2-h--t--,-;:-,
B j -/--+~---l~'
B2 __+-_-L::-;
E I
B
Figure 5.1: Proposed structure of TR-TSC EIS·XQRBBR.
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C,
A ,
Eo
A2
8,
E'
8 2
C,
Figure 5.2: Proposed structureof TR·TSCEIS·AND BBB.
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AB
Figure 5.3: Proposed structure of TR-TSC EIS·OR BHR
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Al ~AZ;JI:~ E I
8 1
8z IJ>------ Ez
"lj
1
1j
1
1]j
A
8
TR-TS C
EISS-XOR E
BBB
Figure5.4: Proposed structure of TR·TSC EISS-XORBBB.
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E2
EI
A I -1t-~-I);-;"~--r-'-!E>-- C l
A 2 __LLr--~~~
B I
B 2 --H----IL~
A
8
c
Figure5.5: Proposed structure of TR-TSC EISS·ANDBBB.
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a .
B, ----U--==)1..::>-, 1-1
E ,
Figure 5.6: Proposed structure of TR·TSCEISS-OR BBB.
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~ c , 1=JB>-- ,',
_~[2)- ---
C "
E'
Figure 5.7: Proposed structure ofTR·TSC EIIS·XOR DBB.
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D,
C ,
A,
B,
B' C,
D'
A TR- TSC
EllS -AND
B BBB D
E
Figure 5.8: Proposed structure of TR·TSC ErrS-AND BBB.
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Figure 5.9: A proposed structu re of T R·TSC EllS -OR BBB .
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,;
Y H ---r.
~
Eo E, 1f, 11. D,D_
Figure 5.10: Proposed structure of TR·TSC MF·OR BBB.
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0 1 U2
m·-OJ _•••-: ... :
C2
Figure5.11: A proposed structure of TR·TSCMF·AND DDB.
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E2
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E2 El
Figure 5.12: Proposedstructure orTR-TSC MF·XOR BBB.
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Chapter 6
Design of two-rail totally
self-checking functional circuits
It is highly desi rab le that digital circuits possess TSC property. Since the TSC
concept was introduced by Carte r et al in 1968, a. lot of work has been done on
the design of TSC circuits . However, there is st ill no simple, convenient, ftexi·
ble, and systemat ic design method available for TSC circuits, especially Cor TSC
functional circuits. In many cases, to achieve a TS C circuit is very difficult and
even impossible. In add ition, the str ucture of conventio nal TSC circuits is usually
complicated and makes it very difficult to locate faulty units. Th is leads to a low
mainta inability.
In order to overcome the limit at ions of conventio nal theories and design method s
(or TSC circuits, new design t heories and methods are formalized in this chapter.
New design met hode are based on 85M and the ne w class of checkers, and make
use of the proposed new BBB~ for eonet ructing T R· TSC funct ional circuits . We
also uae exist ing des ign techniqu es of TR·TSC checkers to build T R·TSC error
propagat ion circuit s.
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6.1 Simple interconnecti on method (SIM)
A design method celled simple interconnect ion meth od (SIM) using new BBBs
is presented here. SIM is suitable for the case that the self-testing property can be
eeeiiy achieved or verified and has a large amount of inputs.
A functi onal circu it which is composed or the proposed BBBs and/or t he prim-
itiveoperator blocks [111·116J is a TSC circuit if and only if it meets the following
co nditions:
C ondit ion 1 : All the basic building blocks in the funct ional circuit receive the
complete minimal tes t sd Ts in their testing vee/ors under normal condit ion when
a sel of diagnostic sequence pairsis appliedto the inputs of the circuit.
C onditi on 2 : There erists at least ont path which makes every single iolemal
fault propagate to one (or a group)of observable error indication outputfs),
C onditi on 3 : All the romponents which form the eM'Or propagation circuits an:
able to receive the complete minimal test sel Ts in their testing "ectors Juring
normal operation,
The str ucture of th is new class of TSC functional circuits consists of two pa rts .
On e part im plements given combina t ional logic functions, the other pert provides
t he pat h to propagat e error indication s. The new BBBs are highly suitable for
the first part while t hey can also be used in construct ing the second part , and t he
pri mitive operator blocks a re efficien t for t he second par t.
We give an examp le to demonstrate SlM for thedesign of TSC funct ional circuits
us ing the pr oposed SBB s an d the primitive operator blocks.
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6.1.1 The Design of TR-TSC full (FA) adder nsi ng TR-
T SC MF bas ic b nilding blocks
Full adder imple ment s t he following logic funct io ns:
So
Co
X; $Y; mC o_1
Xi ' Y;+Xj . Gi_l +1'; · 0 ;_1
(6.1)
(6.2)
where Sj - sum, Cj - carry, Xi. Y; - inputs, C;_I - pre vious carry.
A structure of TR-TSC full adde r is shown in Figu re 6.1.
Any single internal fault willpropagate to an obser vable erro r indication output
IF and any error inp ut willbe indicated at ou tput EI. Th is TR·TSC Cull adder im-
plementation requires considerably more gates than t he TR·TSC full adder circuit
in Figure 4.1. But , the method presented here is generaJ for any funct ion.
Theorem 1T : The full adder descrikd above is a TSC full adder.
Proof : The proposed full adder map s code inputs into code outputs and ncncode
inputs into noncode outputs during fault-free operat ion. Thus, it is code-disjoint
Since th e adder eithe r keeps t he correc t value or gives at leCl.'lt one error indication at
its error indication outputs EI and IF when any erro r inputs or any single internal
stuck -at Cault occurs during norma l operation, it possesses the /auUseeere property.
Its self-testing property can be verified by a set of 6-bit diagnostic seq uence pain
Wi. The complete set of 6-bi t diagnos tic sequence pairs are given in E.l - E.S.
With the &obit diagnoatic sequence pairs , it has been verified t hat each component is
able to receive Tsin its test ing vectors during normal operat ion , which ia illust ra ted
in Figure 6.1. Consequently, the fuJI adder is a TSCfull adde r.
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Since this TSC Iull adder usee two bis:BB Bs and muy other BBBI (SEDTRs) ,
it ie DOl. an economic scheme. Later , we will ptelent a better flCheme usinS EIS
BBBs and SEDTfU.
6.1.2 Decoupling t echniques for relevant error indication
var iabl es
We propose & decoup1ins: metbod to achieve Iep&late error indiations ofEI and
JF in this sect ion. T his willhelp to k>catefaulty unill and enhan ces ma.intainability.
A TS C decoup li ng BBB (DC2 )
T he proposed TSC FA in Section 6.1.1 has two error indication out putl - EI
and IF. However, IF is not ind ependent of t he inputs of the adde r. When a.nyerr or
inp ut appean, both EI and IF indicat e this fault by (00) or (11). In t his C&Se, Cj
and $i have to be di,res:a.rded j therefore, it willbedesirable to have a separate IF.
In orde r to solve the above problem, we propose a special BBB ca.l1~ TR·TSC
decoupling BBB (DC2)' Here, we develop two types of DC2. The T ype I DC2
employs less hardwar e tb&ll the Type II DC2 but ill inte rnal fau lts are reflected at
bot h its outpuu EI and IF. In comparison to t be Type I DC2 , &IIy eiugle stuck·at
fault in the Type II DC2 can be indicated at its out put IF.
The inte rnal constru ct ions or Type I DC2 and Type II DC2 are shown in Fig·
ure 6.2 end Figure 6.3. respect ively. The correepc cding truth tab le is given in
Tab le 6.1.
From Table 6.1, we find that there is no case which both EI and IF are (00) or
(11). 1£thi s case occurs , it mean s that there is a sins:le st uck-at fault in DC2•
95
Theorem 18 : The proposed 7\lpeI Del ia d TSC BBB.
Proof: It is similar to the proof of Theorem 17. Here, it will not be repeated .
Similarly, the Type 11Del is also a TSC DDD.
A dec oupling technique (or relevan t error indication variable,
We give en example to demonstrat e the decoupling method of relevant error
indication variables.
Figure 6.4 is a structure of a TR-TSC deooupling checker (DCt ) with four
relevant er ror indicat ion variables and its truth table is given in Table 6.2.
Theorem 19 : The proposednet is a TSC checker.
Proof: It is similar to the proof of Theorem 17. Here, it wiUnot be repeated.
An example application of DCt is shown in Figure 6.5. Its internal fault detec-
tion is illustrated in Table 6.3.
D~ «(XO ·XI)<oX2) ·X3)+X4
The relationships of four variables are:
Table 6.1: T he truth table of Del.
Ell IFI EI IF
1)/110) (01)/110)
(00)/ (11) (00)/ 11) (01)/ 110)
(00)/ (11) (01) (10) (OOl/ l lI)
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(6.3)
(6.4)
Table 6.2: The tru th table of DC•.
Table 6.3: An example of internal fault detection using DC•.
§."I II, ( :;r ;;;h' 1\ II I' n-,) ,~" '.=- lIWII/l l l) (110)/( 111 iW l/! 111 (lI!})/ l l l l"'J,• . .. • (111)/( 10) lllf1l/l lI ) 1 1~ ! l f l ll l IfJO)/l llt"/j-;- - - - (1I11/lI O) (Ill Jfl lUI ! l ~) lll ll i IUOI/ l I II
~_~~ ((J11/ (l 0l ( 111 1 /(IIl)I ()ll/ I l()I'(IJ01/1 1 1I
If, I F, U·, II'~
/ POI (0 1)/001 11011/( 10)
1!101 n i l lUI )/ IUl I' (OIl/lIlI)
101 1/(lOI ' lOlll/ ( 11l (011/ ( 10)
lOl l/POI l UI)/l UII (001/( 11)
where "_" means that an error indication at the left causes an error indication
at the right.
From Table 6.3, wecan see that any single stuck·at fault is only indicated at its
own error indicator.
6.1.3 Th e design of TR-TSC circuits with separate inter-
nal fault indication IF
TSC circuits with independent IF can be easily achieved using decoupling DBO
DC]. We use a design of TSC FA with separate IF to demonstrat e the design
technique of TSC circuits with separate IF.
An inter nal construct ion or a TR·TSC FA wit h separate IF is shown in Fig-
ure 6.6. Suppcee that. there is only one kind of error which can occur during
normal operation. When the proposed FA receives error inputs, only EI indicates
the faults. When there is any single internal stuck-at fault, IF produces an error
indication.
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J
Theore m 20 : The proposed full adder u a TSC full adder.
Proof: It is similiU'to the proof of Theorem 17. Here, it will not be repeated .
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Figure 6.1: A structure of TR·TSC FA uBinSTR·TSC MF BBBs.
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Ell 1F t
W
EI IF EI IF
Figure 6.2: The internal construction of Type I DC2•
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Figure 6.3: The internal constructionof Type II DC2 •
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Figure6.4: The internal construction of DC4 •
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Q1
Q'
Figure 6.5: Anexample application of DC4 <
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Figure 6.6: An internal const ruction of 'f R·TSC FA with separate IF.
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Q3=====:J
Figure 6.7: A two-rail voter (VT) with three inputs by SIM.
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Q
6.2 Image design method of TR·TSC funct ional
ci rcui t s using BBBs
In many cases, 81M cannot achieve TR·TSC funct ional circuits . For exam-
ple, a two-rail voter (VT ) with three inputs using BBBs, shown in Figure 6.7, is
const ructe d using SIM. VT implements the following function:
Q ~ Q,(Q, +Q,) +Q,Q,
where Q,.Q2. Q3 and Q are two-element vari ables.
(6.5)
Obviously, thi s VT possesses the fault secure property, for it either keeps the
correct value or gives at least one error indica tion at its output Q when any error
input or any single interna l stuck-at fault occurs during normal operat ion. Since
QIoQ2. and Q3 come from three identi cal TSC modular units and always give the
same logic values (01) or (10), each BBB in th e VT can never receive th e comple te
minimal test set Ts during norma l operation. Thus, it is ne t sd/ · testing.
In order to overcome this problcm, we propose an image dcsign method (10 M)
with a pair of complement tran slators.
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Table 6.4: The truth table of CTHS and CTLS,
6.2 .1 'l 'SC com plement translat ors - CTHS and CTLS
Two TSC complement translators are introduced here. One tra nslator comple-
ments its inputs when its strobe Sb is at high level. We call it TSC complement
tran slator with high strobe (CTHS). The other is just the opposite. It complements
its inputs when strobe Sb is [ow. We call it TSC complement translator with low
st robe (CTLS).
Their internal const ructions are shown in Figure 6.8 and their t ruth table is
given in Table 6.4.
Their TSC propert ies are demonstrated in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, respectively.
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Table 6.5: The verification or the TSC property for CTHS.
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Figure 6.8: The proposed CTHS a.nd CTLS.
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6.2.2 Image design method (IDM)
A general design method called image desi&Jl md bod (lDM) is introduced in
tb is sectio n. This method is a.universal technique to desi~ T R·TSC circui ts using
BBBs. In order to make each component receive the complete minimal lating set
Ts. a.pair of complement translators - CTHS and CTLS - is employed.
In order to achieve the TSC goal with 10M, the minimum requirement for a
circuit which implementa the given logic is that the inpu ts of the circuit do not
keep only one logic level du ring normal operat ion .
A general structure of a TR·TSC circuit designed by 10M is shown in Fig.
ure 6.9. It is st ill comp osed of two parts - a TSC funct ional circuit and a TSC
checker. Further I t he TSC funct ional circuit ha.llthree different parts . They are a
TR ·TSC functionaJ.circuit with CTRS. (FC-L), a TR·TSC funct ional circuit with
CTLS, (FC-H), and a TR ·TSC multiple xer (MUX). The ir functi ons durin,!;normal
operation are described below.
1. FC-L: When Sb is low level, it implements ,!;iven logic (unct ions. When Sb is
high level, it no longer gives correct runctional values but proceeds wit h error
diagnosis.
2. FC-H: Its (unction is just the opposite o( FC-L. When Sb is low level, it
proceed s with error diagnosis. When Sb is high level, it impleme nts given
logic (unct ions.
3. MUX: It produces the ou tputs of the TSC circuit. While Sb is low level, it
selects the outputs of FC· L as t he outputs or the TSC circuit; while Sb is
high le vel, it takes the values of FC-Has the outputs of the TSC circuit.
ue
INPUTs
EI IF
Figure 6.9: A general struct ure of TR..TSC circuits with 10 M.
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The TSC checker (",)nsists of a.TSC input checker, a TSC reduction circuit for
internal fault propagation, and TSC error analyzer. The input checker monitors
error inputs. The reduction circuits provides error propagation paths for internal
faults. The error analyzer distinguishes between any input error and any internal
fault from a prescribed set of Iaults.
Since this structure haa two symmetric functional circuits - re-L and FC.n , we
call the st ructure as image st ructure. Consequently, the design method employed
in the design of this kind of TSC circuits is called Image Design Method (10 M).
The 10M is formalized as:
1. FC-L: Place CTHSs at one of the two inputs for all BBBs.
2. r C-R: Place CTLSs at one of the two inputs for all BOBs.
3. MUX: MUX is an EIS-XOR DBB. We locate a CTIIS (CTLS) at its output
and a CTHS (CTLS) at one of its inputs which is connected to r C·L (Fe-II).
4. The TSC checker: Investigate each pair of monitored internal lines. When
it produces only one value (01) or (10) during normal operation, place a
complement translator at that place.
Theorem 21 : The circuit construd ed using IDM JIJ a TSC circuit.
Proof: The resulting circuit maps code inputs into code outp uts and ncnccde
inputs into noncode outputs during fault-free operation. Thus, it is code-diajoinf.
Since the circuit either keeps the correct value or gives at least one error indication
at its error indicat ion outputs EI and IF when any error input or any internal fault
occurs during normal operat ion, it possesses the fault secure property. Because
112
each block is able to receive at least two testinS vectors out of four te!lting vectors
in Ts when Sb is at low level, and receive at least the other required te!ltin g vectors
when Sb is at high level, the self-testing property is also guarant eed. C
Any combinational logic can be implemented by this design meth od. Let us
consider an example of a TR· TSC voter which cannot be achieved by SIM. A
group of simplified symbols of BBBs, CTHS and CTLS is given Figure 6.10. T he
proposed TR·TSC VT is shown in Figure 6.11.
Let Q ML stan ds for the majority value determined by FC·L, and Q M H for the
majority value determined by FC-H, Q is the output of the circuit; then Q= QML
and QMH =I when Sb is low level, and Q =QMH and Q M L =1. Thus, Q always
ach ieves the majority values.
Theorem 22 : The proposed voter is a TSC voter.
Proof: The proposed VT maps code inputs into code outputs and nonccde
inputs into noncode outputs during Iault-Iree operation. Thus, it is code-disjoint.
Since the circuit either keeps the correct value or gives at least one error indication
at its error indication outputs £1and IF when any error input or any internal fault
OCCUtlI during normal operat ion, it poeeeeses the fault " eClJn': property. Because
each block is able to receivea t least two test ing vectors out of four te"ting vectors
in Ts when Sb is low level, and receive at least tbe other required testing vectors
when Sb is high level, the lIelf -testing property is also guaranteed.
Its internal fault indication IF is independent of error input indicat ion EI.
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Figure6.10: The simplifiedsymbols for BBBs, CTUS and CTLS.
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Q
Figure 6.11: A structure or the proposed TR·TSC voter.
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6.3 A new generation of TSC cir cuit s - TSC
error-confining (ECF) circuits
Or dinary TSC circui ts have the capability of concurrent error detection hut do
not have the capabi lity or confinin,!;internal faults in several particular areas. T his
lead, to a low localizability and availability, and " high cost for mainte nance.
A ne w generation of TSC circuits called TSC erro r-confining (ECF) circuits is
introduced here
6.3.1 The definit ion of TS C error ..confining circuits
We define an error-confining circuit as:
Definit io n 13 : A TSC circuit is called a TSC erro r-confining (EeF) circuit if
and only it is capable 0/ confininginternal fQul~ from IIprucri6cd set o/lau!! 1 in
separate areas.
Accord ing to the above definit ion, EC F circu its has many independent areas in
teams of erro r detect ion. When 1I.0y inte rnal fault occurs, it will be Isolated in a
particula r area. Each area has it! own er ror indicator JF;. U any internal fau lt
occur s in i 11ro area, it is only indicated by 1fl. Eacb IF, is independent of each ot her
and also inde pendent of error -inpu t indicati on Et.
6.3.2 The design of TSC ECF circuits
In orde r to form independent erro r-isolation areas , EnS BDBs are prope rly
used to build isolation boundariu.
We give an example to demonst rate t he collfigura tion of TSC ECF circuits.
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Example: An arbitraril y given TR-TSC circuit coDllisting or BBBs and CTHSs
and CTLS is given in Figure 6.12. Suppoee that the input! or each BBB in this
circuit are connect ed to some previousoutputs or input. and itt output is provided
to subsequent 8BBs or as one or outputs or the circuit.
Now, all the BDBs composed.or column 1 and 6, as well as row 8 are used with
corresponding EIIS BBBs 80 that the circuit still keeps the logic runctions during
Ieuh-free operation . The rest or DBBIare EIS BBBs. These placements using EllS
BOBs, shown in Figure 6.13, form eeveraJ isolatioD boundaries. These boundaries
partition the circuit into rour independent parts (Par t 1, Par t 2, Put3, and Part 4)
in a sense of error det ection, The proposed partition is illustrated in Figure 6,14,
These four independent part e have their own independent internal rault indi-
cations - I Flo JF2 , JF3 , and 1Ft • I£ any internal fault oceun, it willbe only
indicated. at its corresponding IFj, For instance, ir any single stuck-at fault or uni-
directional faults occur in Put 2 and there is no fault in the relit or the circuit, the
faults in Par t 2 only indicated at JF2 by (00) or (11). If all four checkers produce
(00) or (11), this means that all four independent part s have internal Ieulte. The
resulting ECF circuit which has four independent error-isolation areas is shown in
Figure 6.15.
Here, internal fault indication IF is independent of error input indication EI.
Thus, the ECF circuit pceeeeeee a high capability of fault tolerance, a high loe&!-
ibility, and a high maintai nability. Of course, all these advantages are realized by
providing additional hardware, The amount of hardware required here i, more than
what is required in the other design procedured, but this method results in circuits
that enable error location,
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Figure 6.12: An arbitrary TR ·TSC circuit using B8 BI,
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Figure 6.14: A proposed pa.rtition for the given circuit with four separate parts.
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Figure 6.15: The resultant'TSC ECF circuitwith fourindependent IF.
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Tab le 6.7: T he truth tab le of TSC moe BBB.
I Eft I El l I IF1 ~ E/ j I E li I IF I
1011 /1101 1011/(101 11111/11 01 1011/(1 01 1011/1101 11111/1 1111
1001 /1111 (011/1101 1001/111) 1001/111 1 1011/1 101 1011/1 101
101 1/1101 (001/111 1 (DOl/Ill I 1011/1 101 1001/1111 (011/11 11 1
(001/1 111 1001/1111 1011/1 101 (001/111 1 (001/1 11 1 IIJlI/IIOI
6.3 .3 A note of isolation boundary
Isolation boundaries are composed of EllS BBBs. Any single st uck-at fault in
an EllS BBB is reflecte d at its two o ut puts. One is its main ou tput [ j.e, EIIS-
AND BBB is output C), and t he ot her is t he sem i-sensit ive out put E (t est output ).
Since this semi-sensit ive out put E reflects one of its two inp uts in a sense of error
det ect ion, if we simply use EIIS BBBs to const ruct isolat ion boun dar ies, a part of
internal faults would pass t he isolation boundaries and make its IF; prod uce an
er ror indication when any faul t occurs in its previous neighboring area Ai_ I '
In order to overcom e this un desira ble Calle, we develop another special TR-TSC
BBB called double-input decoupling (DIDC) BB 8 .
A proposed structure of DIDC BBB is shown in Figure 6.16. It consists of two
DC2• Its trut h table is given in Table 6.7.
Theo rem 23 : The proposed DIDC BBB ill a TSC BB B.
Proo f: T he proposed DIDe BB B possesses the fa ult secure prope rty, for it either
keeps the correct value or gives at leas t one erro r indicat ion at its outp ut IF when
any in tern al fau lt occurs during norma l operation . The self-t esting property is also
preserved. Thi s has been verified by CDS illustrat ing in Figure 6.16. 0
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Figure 6.16: The proposed TSC DIOG basic building block.
To construct an isolat ion boundary, we should consider two cases. One is tha t
each EllS BBB in the isolation boundary is independent of each othe r. The other
is that some BBBs in the isolat ion boundar y are not independent of each other.
For t he inde pendent case, we give the design method which is shown in Fig·
ure 6.17. The isolat ion bou ndary is composed of three EllS BBBs and three DIDG
BDBs and two SEDTR blocks. Any input error is not reflected at IF•. 1F~ only
indicates the fa ul ts which occurs in thr ee DIOC BOBs, two SEDT R blocks, and
a part of t hree Ell S. For the dep endent case, we give the design method which is
shown in Figure 6.18. Similarly, any inpu t error is not reflected at I h I F~ only
indicates the faults which occurs in the isolation boundary itself.
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If.
Fisure6.17: A structure of isolation boundary with independent EllS BBDs.
12.
Ifb
Figure6.18: A structure of isolation boundary with dependent Ell S BBBs.
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6.4 A brief d iscussion on sequential basic build.
ing blocks
Designing a set of sequential BBBs appears very difficult. The re has been
no reported work on the sequential BBBs which can be used in designing TSC
sequenti al circuits. Convent ional schemes of fault tolerance for sequential circuits
can be classified into two ma in met h.ods - fault-masking scheme and st ate-codi ng
scheme. Although these two schemes can be imp lemented with TSC te chnique,
t heir complicated str ucture makes it very difficult to locate the faulty units and
replace th em. Once interna l fault s occur, the whole circuit has to be disregarded.
Moreover, common sequential techniques can not be directly applied to t he design
of TSC sequent ial circuits . This leads to a. high cost of mainlenance and a low
availabi lity. Therefore, it is also desirable to develop a set of universal sequent ial.
BBBs.
6.4.1 A TSC D flip-flop
As one of the most important sequent ial components, D Hip-flop is widely used
in designing sequential circuit s which im plement given sequential logic funct ions.
Unlike theordina.ry 0 flip.flop which can be designed using common logic gates,
t he TSC 0 flip-flop cannot be achieved using TR· TSC BDDs. U we de velop a TR ·
TSC 0 flip-flop using BBBs and using t he similar technique as fo r ord inary 0
flip·flop, the resulting D flip-flop will never work. The reason is that the resulti ng
D flip-flop canno t get out of its initial st ate (00). This means the nip.flop cannot
sta rt automatically.
A T SC D flip-flop based on t he TMR technique {16\ is achieved. Figure 6.19 is
126
its internal construction . IF depends only on masked fault s in TMR system and
all the faults in the error detect ing circuit. S indicates unmasked faults in the
T MR system &'I well &'I a small and constant number of faults in tbe error det ecting
circuit . IF is a warning signal and S is a stop signal.
Theoretica lly, the proposed TSC D flip-flop can be used as a sequential DBBto
design TSC sequent ial circuits. Consideri ng its hardware cost and its gate levels,
it is not an economic and efficient BBB. To develop a pract ical TSC D flip-flop is
a pending and challenging problem.
6.5 Concluding r emarks
In this chapter, we have proposed two design methods - 81M and IDM-
to build TR-T8C functional circuits using BBBs. A special BBB - DC~ - has
been developed. DCl is very useful for designing T8C circuits with separate IF. A
decc upling technique has also been st udied. We have introduc ed a new generation
of TSC circui ts - TSC ECF circuits . TSC ECF circuits have the capa bility of con-
fining internal faults in separate areas . Th e DIDCBBB which has been presented
in this chapter is a key component for building isolation boundari es. Fina lly, we
have presented a brief d iscussion on sequential TSC BBB, and developed a TSC D
flip-flop.
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Figure 6.19: The proposed TSCD flip-flop.
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Chapter 7
An efficient combinational TSC
checker for 1-out-of-3 code
An indi rect design technique for a combinat ional tota lly sel£-checking (TSC) 1-
eut-of-S code checker is presented. In comparis on to the exist ing indirect techn iques
to design combinational TSC l-out-of-S code checkers, the proposed one uses less
hardware. has fewer gate levels, and possesses a higher test capability.
7.1 Design motivation
There havebeen many resultson the problemof designingTSC checkers Cor
t-out-er- n codes, a special subclass of m-cut-of-a code , with n > 3, but only a few
of them relate to t he n =3 case [10], [17], [211. {25J, [301. Reddy 129) conjectured
that no TSC checker (direct design) exist s for t he l-out-o£-3 code, especia llyif the
checker is constr ucted from only AND and OR gates. So far, on ly two direct design
techniques of the TSC l -out-ol-S code checkers have been published, but they are
both. combinational NMOS implementations {21], [30]. Combinational gate-level
imp lement at ions of th.e TSC l-out-of-S code checkers described in [17J, (25) belon g
to indirect design techni ques.
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Bued on the fact that l ·out-of-3 code baa t hree codewcrde and t he5e th ree
eodewords are Dot enough to constit ute . complete tnt let for an independent
combintiooal l-out-o£-3 code checker with respect to .. set of &11 single stuck·&t
faults (29j, the design techniques in (171 &: {25] make Ute of AI. lea.'lt one known
TSC chrxker in a TSC system u t heir auxiliuy conditions. The design methods
presented by Colan in (17) need any available m-out-of'·n code in a TSC Iy. tern
combined with 1-oot-of-3 code to obtain .. reduced (m + I}-out -of· (n + 3) code for
which a TSC checker can be designed. The desipl methoo. propceed by PaKhalis
d aI in [25] also follow the basic idea tha t combines the l ·out·of-3 code with other
codes although t he codes are no longer restricted to fixed-weight codes. However,
a t ranslat or T first translates t he l-out-cf-S code into an incomplete two-variable
two-rail code. Then, the incompletetwo-vuiable two-rail code is properly combined
with the l-out·of-2 code outpu ts of one or more othe r TSC checkers which are
available in a TSC system.
In this chapter , W'C present a combinational TSC l-out-of-3 code checker with
respect to all single stuck·at faults. Th e basic idea to translAte the l-out-o£-3code
into an incomplete two-variable two-rail code (251is al.tOfollowed. We make use of
the complement trans lator (CT HS) to provide the other nrxcuary test input (ot ,
01) (or the reduction circuit which is a TR·TSC EIS·XOR BOB. Thus, the TR·TSC
EJS-XOR BBB can receive its complete test set which consists of four test inputs
- (01, 01), (01, 10), (10, 01), and (10,10) - du ring normal operations.
The terms and definitions employed here Me based on those used in 125].
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T.2 A proposed design method
With the help of any TSC checker available in a TSC system , the TSC l-out -of-
3 code checkers have been achieved in 117], [25]. But any input error or internal fault
from a prescribed set in the known TSC checker willlead to an error indication at
it. l-out-o(·2 code outp ut. In t hat cue, the relIult ing TSC }-out-of-3 code checker
cannot receive all required test input a, Thua , the test capability of TSC l -out-o(-3
code checkers is affected by the known TSC checker, especially when the known
TSC checker is very large.
Here, we present a simpler design which enhances the test capability and uses
less hardwar e and hee fewer gate levels. The }-out -o£-3 code ill also initially trans-
lat ed into an incomplete two-variable two-rail code by the TSC translator T [25).
Then , a TSC complement translator with high strobe (CTHS ) is placed at the
output (aI , hI ) or T. The out put (ZI, Z2) or CTHS and th e output (&2, b2) or
T toget her form the inputs to the TR·TSC EIS-XOR BBB. Th us, the T R·TSC
EIS-XO R BDB receives its test inputs (10, 01), (01, 10), and (10, 10) when Sb is
low, and receives (01, 01), (10, 10), and (01, 10) when Sb is high. Consequently, th e
TR ·TSC EIS· XOR BBB willreceive t he complete test llet during normal operations.
The auxiliary input Sb can be any independent line in a system, which has a
logic 1 level and a logic 0 level during the normal opera tion. For example, we CaD
choose system clock as the auxiliary line Sb .
The gate-level implementations or the translator T is shown in Flgure 7.1. Its
truth t able is given in Table 7.1.
The logic gate implementati on or the proposed TSC checker for J·out ·or·3 code
is shown in Figure 7.2 and its truth table is given in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.1: The t rut h table of the translator T.
Inpu t Outp ut
xi X2 :\ 3 a hi ,,2 111
II 0
0 0 I I 0 0 I
0 I 0 0 I I 0
I 0 0 I 0 I 0
0 I I I I I I
I 0 I I 0 I I
I I 0 I I I 0
I 1 I I I I I
T heore m 24 : The described checker abave is a 2'5C ched er for l.oul-of-3 code.
Proof: T he proposed checker maps code inputs into code outputa and noncode
inputs into noncode outputs during fault-free operation. Thus, it is code-disjoint.
Since the checker either keeps the correct value or gives an error indication when
any single internal st uck-at fault occurs during normal operat ion, it poesesseathe
!aull secure property. It is obvious that the self-lt3ting property is also reserved, for
each oomponent- T, CTHS, and EIS-XOR BBB - receives its own all test inputs.
Consequently, the checker is a TSC checker.
7.3 C om parisons
a
The proposed TSC l-out-of-J code checker uses only 10 logic gates and four
gate-level delay. Although an auxiliary line Sb is int roduced, the probability of
stuck-at faults at a single line is much less than in a complicated circuit . T herefore,
the proposed TSC checker has a higher test capability than the TSC checkers
described in (17], (25]. If the known TSC checker is considered, the presented TSC
checkers in (251has, in the most favorahle case, at least 20 logic gates and six gate-
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Table 7.2: Thf:truthtableorthe prepceed TSCcheckerfer 1·out·or-3 code.
Sb XI X, X bl ZI Z2 iii bo, r
0 0 0 II
0 0 0 l l n t u II 1 II l
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 n n l
0 I 0 0 1 n l 0 I II I II
0 0 1 I 1 l l I l l I I
0 I 0 I I 0 l II l 1 I 1
0 I I 0 l 1 1 l 1 II l l
0 I I I I I 1 I I I 1 l
I 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 n 0 0
I 0 0 I I 0 0 1 II 1 l 0
I 0 I 0 0 I I II I n l II
I 1 0 n 1 n 0 1 1 II II 1
I 0 1 I I l 0 II 1 l II II
I I 0 I I 0 0 I I l 1 I
I I I 0 1 I 0 II I II II II
I 1 I I I 1 0 II I 1 II II
1(2
XI
Sb
Figure 7.2: The logic gate implementationor the proposed TSC checker lor l-out-
or-3 code.
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XI X2 X3
--i ~~- :;r
- -!n T ;
101 ~
."
a t b l .2 b2
Figure 7.1: The gate-level implementation. of the translator T.
level delay, In add ition , it has at least 7 input lines compared to 4 inpu t lines of t be
TSC cheder proposed here. It i. evident tbat the proposed TSC l-out-o(·3 code
checker ill11.Iperior 1.0tbe existing TSC l-out-o£-3 code checkers in [17}.I25}.
7.4 Concluding remarks
The desi!Dmethod for the TSC 1-001-0(-3 codecheckerpropoeedin tbis chapter
is the simplest indirect desip method for the combinational implementation M
logicgate level. It emplOYl leu bArdwAre and fewer gate- level delay. As it does not
depend on &.Dy known TSC checker in .. TSC Iyl tern , it has .. higher test cap&bilit y.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Suggestions for
Future Research
8.1 Summary
In t his thesis, we have presented three types of TR ·TSC BBBs. These BBBs,
like ordinary logic gates in common digita l circuits, can be easily applied to the
design of TSC circuits. Common logic design method s, e.g., Kcmap simplification
technique, can be directly used in the design of TSC circuits . The formalizations
of errong morphi c Boolean algebra 8 5M and t he new classificat ion of checkers lay
down the theoretical foundat ion (or the development of TR-TSC BBBs and the
design of Til·TSC circuits using the TR-TSC BBBs.
According to 8SM , the logic representations of two-rail error indication variable
are 01 for logic 0, 10 for logic 1, and 00 or I1 for error indication. T hus, TR ·TSC
circui ts composed of BBBs not only can implement given logic functions but also
have t he capabil ity of concurrent error detec t ion.
Three types of TR ·TSC BBBs - EIS BBBs, EISS BEBs , and EllS BBBs
have been described. Each type of BBBs consists of three basic function blocks
13.5
- AND-DBB, OR-BBB, and XOR-BBB. These universal BOBs are very useful for
construct ing TR-TSC functional circuits.
Two design methods - srMand 10 M - have been proposed. SIM employs tess
hardware but is suitable for the case where the stl/-Iesl ing property can be easily
ach ieved or verified. The verification of self-testing property of circuits which are
designed by SIM is difficult. On the other hand, 10M can deal with any case. It
is a general design method but uses more hardware. The verification of self-testing
property of circuits with 10M is quite simple.
A very useful DBB - a. decoupling block (DC1) has been proposed and two
types ofTR- TSC DC1's have been developed. DC1 is particu larly useful for design-
ing TSC circuits with separate EI and IF. A new class of TR -TSC circuits called
TSC decoupling circuits has been studied . These decoupling circuits are mainly
used to distinguish relevant erro r indication variables, and to locate fault sources.
A new generation ofTSC circuitscallcd error-confining (ECF) circuits has been
introduced. In a ECF circuit , internal faults are confined in separate areas and
indicated by independent internal fault indicators. These greatly improve main-
tainability, availability, and reliability. A special technique for designing isolation
boundaries has been presented. This has been achieved using EllS DOns and a
dou ble-input decoupling BBB.
A structure of a TSC D flip-flop has been proposed. Theoretically , the proposed
TSC D flip-flop can be used as a universal sequential BOB, combined with com-
binational BBB, to design any TSC sequential circuit. However, the proposed D
flip-flop costs much hardware and has a low speed.
By means of the principle and concept of two-element morphic space theory,
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an efficient TSC combinat ional checker for l-out -ci-S code hll..'l been successfully
achieved. The proposed one uses less hardware, bll..'l fewergate levels, and possesses
a higher test capability.
F'inally, we can say tha t the proposed design methods for TR-TSC circuits using
88Bs and existing operator blocks are simple, convenient, flexible, and systematic
techniques. In addition, the proposed two-rail TSC circuits can detect not only
single stuck-at faults but also unidirectional faults. Thus, they have a wider appli-
eation potent ial. Some of the design teehniques proposed here involve a high degree
of redundancy, but we believe that the increased complexity of hardware will be
offset by the benefits accrued in te rms or fault tolerance.
8. 2 Suggestions for Future Research
Future research could be carried out in the rollowingaspect s:
• Investigate characteristics or various TR-TSC circuits which are composed of
different DBBs. Since the placement s of different BBBs in T R-TSC circuits
cause different flow of error indicat ion propagation, error diagnosis depends
mainly on the relevance of error indication variables. In general, the rel-
evance of error indicat ion variables in a TR·TSC circuit can be classified
11..'I relevant , irrelevant , semi-relevant, condit ionally relevant. Systematically
study the theory or relevance of error indication variables for TR-TSC cir-
euits . Develop efficient circuit st ructure to enhance the capability of fault
diagnosis and improve maintainability.
• Study efficient and practical schemes of error correction for the TR -TSC cir-
cuits which arc composed of the proposed TR-TSC BBBs. Make new TR-
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TSC circuits have the capability ol correct ing undesirable errore. as well as
the capability of confining, locat ing their internal Faults.
• Develop cost-effective TSC sequential components. Study theory and design
methods ofTR·TSC sequential circuits.
• Improve the proposed BBBs and achieve new BBBs which use less hardware
and has fewer gate levels.
• Develop special BBBs to enhance reliability, availability, and maintainabilily.
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Verifications of TSC property for
the proposed EIS BBBs
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Tab le A.l: The tr u th table of EIS·XOn lUllI whichh,ls ,j slu d ; '<l Fault all\'II<'·l ,
Input A Input B Sruck -et -u Stuck-at .!
A, A, B, u, e, F~ {:'I 1:'1
0 I 0 I 0 I II I
0 I I 0 I II I I
I II II I I II I I
I II I 0 0 II II I
Tabl e A.2: Th e t ru th ta ble of El$·XOH Bill! which Ita» a slud; · ,11 f"l1 l! ;11 ~a1<'·L
Input A Input B S tuck-at.tl S luf k· <lI· 1
;I, A, B, B, E1 /:'1 / ;' 1 ,.:~
0 I II I II II II I
0 I I 0 I II I I
I 0 II I I II I I
I II I II II I II I
lnput A Input B Stuck-ar-u Sun-k-ar-!
A. A~ H, 1:..\ /C, I;'. / ;'1
0 I II I I
0 I I 0 I II I II
I II II I 0 II I
"I 0 I 0 0 I I I
Table A,4: T he tr ut h table of El$·XOIi 1I1H'! whirh Iii", iL slllc k·" l f,\Illt <l L'IilL," 1.
Input A Inpu t B SIuck·1I1·n Stuck-at- I
A, ,I , B, n, E , t; t', 1';1
0 I 0 I 0 I I I
0 I I 0 0 n I n
I 0 0 I I n I 0
I 0 1 0 0 I I I
ISO
Inp ul A Input B SlIwk.·f\ I ·lI S I,,,- k.·;,l ·1 I
-I , .-I I , IJ~ /'.'1 ~ . / 'I r." L _f.': J
u I' ''I' ':' I u ;1 " i I I" I I u " I, I, " " I " i I' I
I " I " " "
II l I I
Table A,; : 'l'hc t ru th la lJle or EIS·r\.\"1JHUll \\"1,;, 1, h,, ~ il ~ 1 1I ,. k ' ''l Fault ill ,C,i1 I, · i.
c.
Table A.8 : The I t'u lh rab!e of 1·;IS-,\ .\"J) li lli l whid l I' il ~ II slll ,k·" , ra li l l al ~ill , ' . "l
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lnpu t A Input B S lul' k· ,,1·l) St u,·k·;\I· l
:1, :t ~ I n, IJ) r; I':) II C", ( ':!i r ,J I':) rt ,!.:~~~L
II I II 1 0
1 :~TIii' j'l "T'Tl0 I 1 u I
1 0
"
1 II ::li :: !"'II: ::tijl: II 0 I II II i : I II I ! I II I ..!-i
Table A.lO: T he t ruth tnble of EIS·:\:'\D Il lll\ whidl h,,~ " .~' II , k, , ' 1 L'llil a l l;"I ,' I
IIl I/ll l A
:11 .'h
II I
U 1
I 0
I 0
InpII I B
II, H~
U 1
I II
" I1 u
Table A. l l: T he t ruth t ablc of 1 ':IS · .-\ ~ IJ IW I! II'll i,11 I ,a ~ il '.11,..1.·,,1 1'.'1111 ;,1 ~,d " ,. J.
ln put A Input B SI 1l(·k·"1-0 S1Ilt'k·" l·I
il l : 1 ~ fi, n, 1';, i; ,', ,
"
1:', ' I:" ~ r', ( ',
n I 1 0 I U II 1 I
'l l" 1 Io I I o I " II I I 1 1 11 o Il I I Il II 1 J I il l 11 o I U 0 Il II II u I I II
Table A.12: The t ru th rahle " I' 1-: 1:-: :\~ I J IlIlI! will' II Ii,,, ,, ~111 1 k','l 1'., 11 11,,1 l!,' oI....s.
S1nd HI I·U
(' ( '
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Srurk- nt-!
I~ ' /':l (' , ( . ,
I I n
I U 0
[ lJ (J
I I I
Tab le A. I:J: The t ru th I nh l~ of 1·:IS·,\.\: I) Bll ll whir-lr Ila .~ d _, llI,·k·'11 laul r a t gille>7.
IUl' ll l A
.,1, ..I I
II I
II I
I II
I 0
Table A.J.I; Th e t rut h tahlc uf EIS-/\ \ [) Il llllw hid l t la~ iL slll.-J..,( t filull ilt gi(h'·~ ,
Ilipu t A
o I
II I
I "I U
Ta ble A,15: The tru t h tilbl('o f EIS·:\ ,\ [) Ill ll lw lli..h I , . I ~ <I , 111'\.;·" 1 Fault ,lI ~itl(,·ll .
lnput A Inpu t B Slu,k·al·U St uck-a t -I
..II ..I j IJ, 131 I~' I t; [', ( , r; J:'~ e, t,
"
I U I 0 I II I II I I I
U I I 0 I 0 0 I I n I I
I 0 0 I I n n I I n I I
I 0 I 0 0 I n n n I I 0
Ta ble A. 16: T he truth ta ble of EIS-,\:\ I) IUl ll wh i.-l, hilSiI sturk- ut f"'111 a t lI;ill('.IO,
Input A II Input B 5111, k·III·0 Stuck-at -I
..tl A IJ, EI El e, e l e, Hj C l ('.1
0 II 0 I 0 I
"
n
"
I 0 I
0 I I U I n , n I n 0 I
I U 0 I I U , 0 I II 0 I
I 0 I 0 0 I I 0
"
I I I
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Table A.17: T he tr uth table ut"[~ IS-OH Bli ll whid, I,as ,L~1 1Wk ·., 1 f,,,, h .,1 ~al " . 1.
Tabl e A . IS: Th e t ruth ta ble of EIS-O ll BIIJl whid l has; \ »tu.-k-nt [ault al j!,.,I,··:!
[nput A
.-I, ..\
Input A Inpu t B SLuck- ;,I-O Sluck ·;,I ·1
AI '-\ 2 e, 111 E\ E,) IJ, J) t ":, r~ IJ, IJ !
0 I 0 I 0 I II I I I I I
0 I I 0 I 0 I
"
I
"
I
"I 0 0 I 0 0
" "
I
"
I
"I 0 I a 0 I I
"
I I II
"
Ta ble A.20: T he tr uth table of 1';lS-011 HUll \.-1l i, I, I,as ;\ " I " r1;·;'1 Faulr ;d I.\al, '·1
I I I
U I 0
n I n
I (J (J
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Table A.21: T he truth table (If EIS·OIl Bti B which lIit~: it .~ l ll( ·k - it t fa u lt at gat e·.').
Input A [up ut B Stll ("~ · 'II ·O St uck.a t-!
:\ 1 A~ u, u, HI E: n, IJ~ I~·I I;': n, 0:
o I n I o n
" "
I
"
I I " Iu I 1 n I 0 : 1
"
I I I I I
I
" "
I 1
"
I
" I I I I I II
"
I
" " "
I I
"
I I
"
Tab le A.22: T he tru th table of 1~[S·O I { IlB ll whir h has a sLllrk·at (,HIlt at ga te-G.
Input A Inp ut B Sl nr k·al -0 Sll lC ~· itl · J
A , :h IJ, 13: HI /';1 o, 0 : 1:"1 I~'J o, 0:
0 I 0 I 0 I 0 1 I I I 1
0 I 1 0 0 0 0
"
I 0 I n
I 0 0 I c Il Il
"
I u 1
"1 0 I Il 0 I I o I 1 0 u
Table A.23: Th e truth table of EIS-e}l( 111111which ha s it sl l1l'k·it t fitlt1t itl g <ltl··i.
Input A Input B
n I
" 1I U
I 0
Sluck -llt.· I
Table A.24: Th e tr ut h ta ble uf EIS·()H Ill l lllI' llid l llilS.l s l IIrk·at fault ill !!,ilte-:l.
Input A nptu B Sl ur k-ill·0 Stuc k-at- l
A ..I. II Y, 0 E fJ 0 , t: u, OJ
o 1 0 0 I Il 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0 I I
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 I I
1 0 I 0 0 1 1 I 0 I I 0
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Table A.25: The t ruth t"hh· " I' 1·:lS·(j H 1Ilil l ll'lii, h b. IS .I ~ I \ I' \, _,I Lmlt "I 1:,;,1, ' !l .
Inp\llA Input B Slll d..-ut -l} ~l lI d' · ; t l · 1
.·1 0 , IJ . I~' /. /J /J .
Il , 0 , u
, I[ " l' I" 'IIJIl , , 0 I n u u r u 1 " , I "jI tI tI I I II I) I ll :1 I 1/ 1_:__::.,
"
,
" "
I I lJ i ll il II
Tab le A.26: The t ruth t ..ble ul"I·:IS·OII 1lII Il II'I,j, I, h." ,I _III' 1;.01 I.lIIh " I J!" ,l,· Ill.
Input A Input B Sl ll, k·,,! 'J Sl ll rk ·;II.·!
:1, A , B, IJ, F:, I-:~ /I , /J, 1':, I ':~ /J , /I,
o I o , 0 ,
" " "
I
" ntI 1 1 o 1 0 I "
, u I
1 o 0 I I tI I u ,
"
I
1 o I o 0 , I 0
"
1 1
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Appendix B
Verifications of TSC property for
the proposed EISS BBBs
Table 8 .1: The truth tnblo of EISS-XO H Il il il whi ..I, !I:I_" , sl lw!; -al [;,u l l ;,1 ~a l, · -I .
Table 8 .2: The l ruth tab le orEISS':\OII lll Hi Id, j. Ii to' l' a " 'h'k-.01 rautt ,,, !!,;!I,·,-2.
Input A Innnt B Sl llrk·al·(j :-;'"r~ · ;, r · l
A, il-l I
II I II I iII I I ~ II : I II II I II II II II I : II II I () (J
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Tab le B.3: The truth table of EISS- /\;'I'IJ IlBH which has a stuck -at fl1ult at gale · I.
Input A Input B Stuck -at -Il Sturk-ar. !
A, Ih o, D, EI t: ( ', ,
0 I 0 I 0 0 I
"
I u I
U I I 0 I 0 II I I I I I
I II II I I II II I I I I I
I 0 I II 0 0 II II II I I II
Table 8. 4: T he t rut h table of EISS· AND !:IBB which has a stuck -at Fault at gate -2.
Input A Input B II St.uck·al ·n I Sturk-at-!
A, A, o, n, II E, t: r, (' I "", I~' C I'
0 I 0 ~ II ~ :, I: I:, I ; I: '(0 , , I, 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 I
, 0 , o 0 , I 0 , , I I
Table 8 .5: T he t ruth tabl e orEISS·A"D lum which 11a.\ il .~tllrk-aL Isuh at gatc-3.
Input A Input B Sluck ·al ·O Stuck-ar- !
A, A, 0 , D, E, C r
0 I 0 , 0 I : II : I0 I I 0 I 0 , 0 I II 0 0 , I 0 II , 0 I I
'--'-
0 I 0 0 , , 0 0 , 0 0
Tabl e 8 .6: T he t rut h tabl e of EISS·Al\' D BHH which ha.~ a stuck-at Feuh at gate -a.
Input A Input B Stuck-m-Il Stuck -at- !
A A B 0 E I::~ C'l (.', I~'I B2 C, C,
0 II v I ' 1 "
, 0 II 0 I 0 I
0 I I 0 I II 0 I I 0 0 0, 0 0 I , 0 II I 1 0 0 0
I 0 , 0 0 I I 0 0 I , I
IS'
Table B.7: The truth tableofEISS ·AND HUB whichhas ,\ stuck- a t f;\\llt at gah '- ,i .
Input A Input B Sln rk'1l1-0 ~- Sluck- al · 1
,'\ n IJ. I'
! 0 0 I [[ II I I I
0 1 1 0 1 ill I I II 1 I1 0 0 1 I o 0 1 1 II I I1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 II I I II
Table 13.8: The truth table of CISS·AND I3HBwl1 i ~11 ha.,; ,I sl lwk·a t filull ;,' /lI all·.I;.
Input A Input B SI Uf k' ;ll -0 Slwk·al · 1
A, A, 11, nc (, (', 1':1 I ;' l (' , ( ,
0 1 0 0 r,T II II 1 II 1
0 I 1 0 0 I II II I II II I
1 0 0 1 0 I II 0 I 0 II 1
I 0 1 0 I 0 1 0 II I I I
Table B.9: The trut h table or E1SS·{)11 Hll1l whidl l" ls a , IUl l· '11 [all]l ;,1.l;al l·. I.
Input A Input B Stll rk ·ill ·n SlIll'k '; \I ' !
.4, .4, D, 13, I~' I 1':1 IJ, IJ, 1;'1 /;'1 IJ, /) 1
0 I 0 I 0 I 0 1 I 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 C II II I II I II
1 0 0 I 0 0 0 II I II I II
1 0 1 0 0 I I 0 I I 0 II
Table 13 .10: The trut h table of EISS-OB. HllJllI' llidl IJ ;~~ " sl urk ·,t! fault at gate-::!.
Input A Input B Stuck-at-O Stuck-ai- l
A, A, B, B, E, £1 f) , /) '1 ,,'11 1'2 f) f)
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 I II"
0 1 I 0 I 0 I
"
I I 1 I
1 0 0 I I 0 I o I I 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 I 1 0 1 1 0
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Ta hle B.Il : The truth tab le of EISS-OR BIni which hils Asluck-at fault at gate-S .
Input A Input B Sturk-at-Il Siurk -at-j
.4, .4, n, IJ-: £1 I~'l u, I), o,
II I
"
I
" I II II
I
"
II II ; I ;"
I I II I II I II I
I II II I I II I II I II II II
I 0 I 0 0 I II II II I I II
Table 9.12: Th e t ruth table of EISS·OR BBB which has 11-stuck -at raull at gatc--1 .
Input A Inpur B Stuck-at-Il Smc k-at-I
.4, .'1/ e, n, E, F.'I I) , I), 1~1 f:1 0 , 0 ,
II I II I II I o I II I II IiII I I 0 I II I II I II II 0 0 I I o I " I II II 0 I 0 0 I I I II I I
Table 8 ,l3 : T he truth table of EISS-OH.JUJUwhich h;~i <1 sUWk-i\l raull at gille-.').
Input A lnput B Sl IKk·at ·\l Stur k-et -!
.4, .4, B, tc 1;;0 o 0
0 I 0 I II II I
0 I I !III 0 II 0 I 0 I 0I U 0 I I 0 0 0 I 0 I 0I 0 I o 0 I 0 0 0 I I 0
Table 8. 14: The t ru t h ta ble or E ISS-O II BUB wlJid l hils it s1.lI rk ·at Fauh at gale-6.
Input A nln cut B Sl uck-al- a Stuck-at- I
.4, A2 It H, 1 8, EI £.1 IJ, o,
""1 E1 0 , 0,
0
: I ~ I ; 1 0 I II I II II I II I0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I II o 0 I I 0 I 0 I 0 I I
I o I 0 0 I I II II I I I
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Verifications of TSC property for
the proposed EllS BBBs
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Table C.t : Th e tru th table (I( l.;ltS':\OIl 1111 11 whirh 1. ;1 .~ ,. -turk-ut-f} Iauh ,It
gate -L
Inpu t A luput B Sl 11rk· ;tl·ll
..I. AJ n, IJ, HI r, ,', (') IJ, IJ) s::J,io
n I' 'T " I ,i 'TI -I)U I I " I I I I I I " : "I , U I I I I I il' n I "I 0 I , U I I u I
" "
I
Tabl e C.2: T he truth table or 1': I IS-.\ OH lll ll lll'hidl II;" il ~l lwk -i11 - 1 fil lill il l
gate- t o
Input A
"II ..h
o I
u I
I U
I 0
Input D
1J1 IJr
, I
I "U I
I 0
Table C.3: T he r-uth tilbk· "r 1,: l h -,\ OIt nun ",Iii, I. ["" " _I III I; "I ·() r;"dl ;,1
ga te- 2,
Sl urk';l l -11
£1 I':~ r', t, /J1 f) ~ I~'i t:
I
I
(] I u I
"
I
, (] (] I
"
I n
(]
I n u I n I nI I
"
I u (] I
Tabl e C.4 : T he t ru th Lahk' of Ell S· .\ () [( IIIIII ", Iii, h Ih"" , Iu, I-; ;11-1 fit.,ll ,II
gate -2,
Input A Input B Slnrl-;-i ll·] --
,I , A, n, n, h', I" ", ( .~ H, /)1 n; f;'j
"
I o I I I (] (] (] I (J II
0 I I U I
"
(] I I
"IIIIII 0 0 I I
" "
I I (J I 0
1 0 1 0 I I I I I (J o ]
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Table C. ·j; T he truth Lallie 01 1" EllS·:\ Oll Il'il l which l li l .~ ,I ~ L lJ c k 'H \ ' O Fa ult al
gale·:).
JlLpU~ A Input B SllI<' k-i'lI· l)
Al :1l 13, n, I~' I 10', r', (', f) , IJJ I':; 10';
u ,
"
,
"
, , , , ,
, I'
u , , U ,
"
U , , o
,I", u u , ,
"
U , , U ,, 0 , U 0 , , 0 , 0 o ,
Table C.O; The tru th 1:111 1<: "I" 1,:IIS·:\Ol l HIIB which 11i\S iI stuck -ar- I fa ull ill
g:llc·3.
Input A Input B Stuck-ur-I
A , LJ 11, F:I e, ( ', ( \ f), OJ /'" r ;
u , 0 ~ : , " , I 0 , I: ,0 , , n , , U u U
, U u , , U , , 0 0 0 0
, 0 , U 0 , o u 0 0 , ,
Tablu C.7: T he tr ul lr t able or EllS·:\ OIl Uli B whid l IH\S ,I ~ l u rk ·i\ t · O l"il1lh a t
gate -4.
lupu t A Input B Sllwk·a,-O
:I I A~ IJ, 11, EI F:1 ( ", C1 f) , 0 1 f ' tc;
o , 0 I U , U U 0 0 0 0
0 I I 0 I 0 U , , , , ,
, 0 0 I I U U , I , , ,
I 0 I 0 0 , , 0 , n 0 ,
Table C.S: T he truth t.abh-of EIIS· .\:Oll 1IIIIIwliid i 1101" ,I ~ IIIC k 'il l · 1 fa lill at
gate-t.
Inp ut A IUflUI B Stuck-ar- t
A , A1 111 Hz E1 I':l 1", c, i ll o. /' " Ii."
0 I 0 I 0 , U , I U ,
1
0 ,
"
I I 0 I 0 0 0 , , I ,
I 0 0 I I 0
"
0 , , I ,
I 0 , 0 0 I I I I I 0 0
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Table e .g: The tru th ta hl" of 1·:!IS·\OH IIBB whirl! 1,.I~ ., ,,111\·k; ,I·n 1'"ull ;11
gate-S.
l uputA luput B xmck .ar-u
..I, A, U, 0: 1:', I':~ I ( " C! ' 0, IJ: I..!:LL!] ",.J
0 , 0 I
"
'ir , "I'l "T]0 , , 0 I 1I I II , I II I UI 0 0 I I 11 n , I ll, I III 0 I 0 0 , II
"
II () I I
Table C.lO: T he tr uth table or Ell s·\On IlBB II'lii,.], l,as;j ~ lI ld;·nl-1 [ault al
gate-S.
Input A Input B Sluck·ill ·l
., .\ 11, IJ./ h', I,' , ,. (J , IJ! t: I·:
0 I ~ 0 , , , I I ,0 I , ,
"
, II II
" "I 0 0 , I II , II II II II
I 0 , 0 0 , , ,
" "
,
TaM.: C.ll : T he tr uth t nbh- " I' EIIS·\O Il IIIW whid. '".., ,j "". I, -al· O r."dl il l
gate-6.
Inp ut A Inp ut B Sll wk-al·O
A\ fh u. /32 £1 f';,: C, C, (J, /} J E; I,',;
0 , 0 I 0 I II
"
II
" "
II
0 I I 0 I 0 II u I I , ,
I 0 0 , I 0 II 0 I I , ,
, 0 , 0 0 I I
"
I 0 0 I
Table C. 12: The truth tillJlC or 1·:IIS·\OII 1liliS II'llid l h."" , 'nd"a l-I fll ilit ;,1
gate-S.
Inpu t A Input B Slwk·at· 1
A n u I:' I:' r', i; /:';_J
II II II , I: I " 1 \1 0 ,' I0 I I 0 I II , I I) III, 0 0 , I
"
, I " , n
I 0 I 0 0 I , , , , U II
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Tahle C. I:.!: T he trut h t01I, I(-' lJf EIIS·.'\OH IllJB which hus ~ stuck-ut.u Fault at
gate.7.
Input. A lnptu B St u('k·<lI·1I
A, II ", II u, F:1 H, II ("I ( ' ! n, n. I~" f:" ~
n I II " I I " o II ~ I " I I II In I I 0 I
u I u
I
"
II I II "I U u I I I II II II
"I U I
"
0 I I 0 I I 0 0 I
Table C . J.I: T he truth t al.lc uf E/ IS·.'\O II Il lllJ whid l I", s n ~t lld'; ·01 l · 1 r..uh 'll
gale· 7.
IllpUl A lnput B Sruck -at-!
A A II I~' I~ , r ' ( '
"
, I " I I n I
:I~ I '0 I I 0 I 0 II I "I 0 0 I I 0 0 I I 0 I 0I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I 0 0 I
Table C. 15: T ile tru th tuhk- or 1·:n S·.'\OH Wil l whirl l II..., il , 11IdHjl -O rault a t
gate·S.
Input A Input B Slu("k·al·ll
..I I .'b IJ, H! F:I I~'! ( ', c, u, n, I~'i f:',j
e I 0 I 0 I 0 I tl
"
0 tl
0 I I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I
"I 0 0 I I 0 [) I I 0 I 0
I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I 0 0 I
Table C . IG: The tr uth tahlc of EIIS·.'\O I1 111111 \\,lli.-l. llil~ ,I ~lllcl; ·al·1 f;w lt at
gate-B.
Inp ut A in put B Stuck-at- I
.-II A~ ts, a, E, I~'z e, c, IJ, 0, E' t:
0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I
o I I
"
I 0 u I I I I I
I 0 0 I I 0 n I I I I I
I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I I 0 0
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Tab le C.l i: T he truth t ilh l!' uf EIIS· ;\O \{ lIlll! whi..h 11 ,IS ,I .~l lld; · aH) f.' lllt oil
gate-g.
Input A Input D SIIl,k ·" I·()
..I I A) H, H, t: t: 1' , c, n, IJ! ,.:- ,...
II
: I! t: I "!II :1" I' " I I i I III II I n II , J ii
tJ Ii I
II
I u II u I I I II i," l ',il' II III o , u II I U I I tJ II II I I
Table C.tS: The tr uth Lallie ,,[ 1·:IlS·\G H Ill l l l lI'l lkl l It",., sl ll' ·!;· ;lt · 1 Fault .It
gate-S ,
Input A Input B Sl lId; -"I -1
Al til n, u, i: t:
u , u u , II , I II I
0 I , 0 I , I I II II II II
I II 0 I I I , , II II II II
I 0 I 0 0 I I II I o II I
Tab le C.l9: Th e lru t ll t.l hl t, o[ EII.'i·:\O Il Ilil il \\"hi,h 11" .~ ;' ,I II,-I;·;.t · () r;"d t ;,1
gate-to.
lnpn t A lnpnr B Sl lwk·al ·()
A, .-II a, n, El l E, r ', r.. II, n, /--, /-:U
0 I I 0 0 ill
I Ii II
,
"IJ0 , , II , 0 II 1 '1 II I II, 0 0 I I 0 II (~ i : II I I II, 0 I 0 0 I , II I ,
Table C.20: T he truth lal JIi' or [-:lIS·:\O H 11l11l \\-I!i, !t [1,1_' 01 ~ l ll' [; at ·l Lruh ill
gete-Iu.
[ -I I
tI (J U
u lJ 0
II () I
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l;lble C,:!I: T he t rut h tat,l" l ,f ElIS-:\ OIl 11111 1 \dllfh I ", ~ a ~lwk · ;tf·O fafltl at
gate-H.
[npnt A 11I[llll B Slu ck ;,I ·{I
.'11 A, n, IJI HI /\' 1 r, ( 'I o, f) , lI'j 10';
u I Il I u I n I n I Il ~ ,
u I I u I Il Il I I IJ I
I U U I I o IJ I I o I IJ
I 0 I 0 Il I I Il I
"
U o
Table C.2:!: T he t rut h tal, lc "r EllS· .'\OH Bili l which h il~ " ~ tIl <: k· iLl · 1 Fault at
gale·ll.
IU]lUl A Input. B SIUCk-ill-1
: 1, .'!-t n, IJJ 1:'1 1:'1 ( ', ( ' i i f), IJ ".j I,';
"
I o I U I
"
I IJ I 0 0
IJ I I o I 0 IJ I I 0 I I II U U I I Il U I I Il I I
I 0 I Il U I I o I o U I
Table C.23: The truth tahlc "r 1] IS· .'\OH IJIIH 11"1,\,.1, hils i\ ~ l\ l<· k · a t · O fault at
gale -12.
luput A Inpu t B Slurk -al·O
:I ] ,.IJ o, II, t: Ii, (' , (', IJ, n, /\'j I,"
Il I Il I 0 I Il I Il I 0 I
n I I n I 0
"
I I 0 IJ IJ
I Il Il I I Il n I I IJ Il IJ
I 0 I U 0 I I II I 0 0 I
Ta ble C.:H: TIH~ t ruth t ilbk· or 1·:I1S·:\ OH BIIII \\'llidl 11i' ~ ;0 -tur-k-at-I (au lt a t
gale-12.
lnnnt A Input B Sruck.m .!
1..1, l A, IJ IJ Ii f " 10"
0 I I " II U 1 I I0 1 I 0 1 0 II I 1 0 I 0
I o 0 I 1 0 II I I o I o
I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I 0 I !
168
Table C.25: T he tru th t;II,I" "f EI IS·'\ UII IJIlI! 111 11"11 h." ., ,1110'1;-., , -(1 L,ull ,II
gate-13.
I IIJllll A . Input B SIIIl'k·;,, ·{i
..I, : I J Ii , 11~ t: h C', ('1 ' /I, II I i: /-.' :
"
, 0 I II , i II , : I II TTT~]u , I II , II
I
II
" I I I"W"I II II I , II II I ! I I II I II
, II , o II , , I ll i l l ~; l1 l1
Table C.26: The t ruth tnllh' <I f ElIS-.\OH 11 1111 II'llk ll 1,.1., " ,111 '1.- " , I r.lllli "I
gatc-13.
lnput A I IIPlil B Stnd,·"t· 1
..1, :l J 11, 111 r, I~'! 'I ( " c, 0 1 !J ! ~ /':!J£
o , 0 I II
'11"
' !lIr~1II I , II , I) II
' I I II 1' 1'I II 0 , I n II I til l I
I 0 I 0 o , , Hil l lJ I 0 I
Table C.27; The t ru t h tahle ol EIIS· ,\ .\ 1) 111I111I'1I i.-l, I".. " ,I ,,, Ih " f"lIll "I !!.;,I ,'-l .
;~-=:J
[iIT!IED
r 11 lJ- T
: II I !J J
II II I
n I lJ
I"put A Input B S" II'I,;· ;II ·O , SllIo!
..I , .'I J 1 11, I1J I~'I I-.'! ; n, /J 1 I ( i.L.~_:.:...t E!J J..': ] l j;=
u I 0 I II , II
,I"TIfT,:,II I 0 0 o n " II II I! )11 IJ ,, 0 n II 0 ,
", 0 0 , o
"
I :: Jj !/! (1) I, : It (:'..
Tab le C.28: T he t rut h tabl e of Ell'i -..\:\ 1) Illl ll lI l,i.-l1 I,;"" , I I1,I;·at ralill <It I,!, ;ll, ":! '
11l1)UlA Input B SllI,.k·;l, ·!I , Sl l l l' ~-~I~d
.-11 A J o, B, e, EJ IJ , nJ ( ' . ( 'J I~' , e, .'~!..4~ ~ ( 'J
0 I 0 , II
, I o 1110 , II u 1-,j-r o IJ IIII I I II I I I I ! II I I , " ' I" II ,I 0 II , I , ' I , I II , , lJ J n u JI 0 I 0 e I ii , II I II , IJ u_ _.!....L.!.... L!J
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Inpu t A 11I1IlIt B Slu ck 'i11·0 I s!ud...tl·I
..I, 111 II, U: H, t; 1 0 , I I) : ~ t ·, ( ': ~ /;', /.:: IJ, IJ, C, c,
II I II I II 1 ' 11 1 ' J 11 , 1 I II I i I I I III J I U I II i I I II II I I I Il ,I I II I I
I II II I J
II i i i II ii ", : 1 Ii I It . II
,
II 1 I
I U I II U 1 II II I II II II ~' U 1 II
Table c.ao: The t rull, l nl, ll' "r E[IS-:\ :'\1>111111wlOld, I , .,~" ~ ... , k·" l (;11, 1. III ~.. tr--} .
~..!.~!J~lIl A IUllII lO SI' ll"k· ;,I,U SIlI r-k-at- !
.,1, .'11 II , /I : I~' , 1,', 1 IJ , O! ' ( ' , , ( ' ! i t: J;'J I I, OJ (.' , C,
II I 11 I 11 ! 11 1 il
"I'
II I 1I ; II 11 11
11 I I II 1 11 I II 11 I I 11 , ' I u 11
I 11 11 I I 11 1 11 I r 1 1 11 1 II 0 II1 11 I 11 U I I I I 1 II I 1 0 I 0
Input A l" I)IIt B Slud;-,...·O SIIWk-ill · l
..', .'\ J /I, I:", r, I', f), C, C l
II 1 0 I o I
::
I 1
11 I I 11 1
" dI I I 11 : i 0 0 1I 11 0 J 1 U 11 11 I I I 0 I I 0 0 1I 0 I 11 0 I II o 11 0 U I I 1 1 0
'f able C.32: The t rut h table of EIIS·,\X I) BlI lI wl,id , l l ll ~ iI SLIKk ·itl fau lt at gilll:-·G,
luput A In lU I B SI1H"k·l1HI Stm-k-at -!
,' \ l .·1 (", c. I~' , HI I~, 1 ~ 1= ~ ;.¥11 1
" " "
II
"
11
"
I 0 I
11 1 I 11 I 0 I II 11 1 1 11
'ii 0 01 0 U 1 I 11 I II 11 1 I 11 1 I 0 0
I 0 1 II 0 1 I 11 1 II II I I 1 I 1
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TableC.33: The trut h table of EIIS· ;\ :\ I) 1I1III whuh 11<" ,I ,1 111'1",, 1 [,' Ull ,,1 ).\;' 1" ' -;
Input A Input B SIIId" il1,0
.~. e-r-r- f\"'k~~A, ,'I} u, IJ! 1:', /:'~ i /I I
n !I ;,L,i' f~i ''1]0 , 0 , I) I) !I \1 ,U , , I) , II u 1 '1 II I ! II I I
, 0 0 , , u I , II IJ I I 0 I I II I I
, 0 , 0 0 ,
,
, I) IJ II Ill. I ~_. L _!!...J ~ ~ J
TAble C.34: The truth lable or EllS· :\ :\[) II\IB wl,idl II,,' " "' 11 I" ,L\ r,lII lt iI' )/,;,11' ''',
Input Input B SIIIf"k·a l·ll St llck·ill· 1
AI a IJ I,· I:' i , 1:'1 1-:) / ~ ~ 'F ~ (\~
0 0 n'! I i\ II I) I-of! ,;-[ , 'If n
I) , , I) , II it I I II II ::
I) , I) : ', II o I
, I) I) , , n
"
, I II II , II I..~(J I, 0 , I) (I , ii , II I I I) II , I.. (J L.!.... ~
Input A Input B SllIck ·a t·ll
-
SIll'
..1, ... n
"
t: t., "1 : /I , '~ 1-:1 J-.'~ /I ,
I 0 , I (I
0 1 '
: i!':!:, 01) " , I)0 I ,
"I' I , ,, II
"
, , II ii I I II II , I I , ,, 0 , I) 0 II , , i , , i , ,
"
, ,
.._-
Table C.36: T he truth lahk, "I' 1':IIS·() !l 111111" I,i, I, h"", ',I' I,k,.,l f," 11 1 ii' !I." I,' ·I ,
~c, /)1 u,
I (J I
I I lJ
I I n
o I_ I IJ
Input A Inp ut B St uCk ·ill·{j SIIJ, k·
A , :\2 IJ, U, 1:'1 E, ", r', / .o, "b!-
0 I 0 I 0 I I I) I I
II , I! I) II) :,jI) I 0 0 , I , I , I) , I)
I 0 0 0 , I I I , , I) I I) II
I 0 0 I U I I I I) , I) IJ I) II
Table C.:I1: The truth t able or EI IS·O Il BUll \\l li.-lt h,IS iI slill k-a t r"ult ill gil t e -:~.
IUl' ul A Input B SIWk·ill·il Sill' k.er.J
..II ..t, 11, JJl I~' t: i f ' f) 0,
'Ti II , II " l! i : I I I~ , :: !, IIII 1 i o II II , II 1 0, II II 1 II u :i 11 II 1 I II , II u II , II, II 1 o II 1 i , II 1
"
, , , , , 0
Table C.38: The truth ruble of EIIS ·OIl Bll ll whid l Iii's ' 1. ~I'l< k·HI Fault ilt gat,'. :t
Input A lnpur B Sl lI,·k·al·1I SI IWk-.lt ·I
:I I ,., ,", 11 H, ~ /'." r -, ( ' , I 1J, n, r; " i : c.
II , 0 ,
): :: "
, I-p
'11" I ' "
,
II , , II II , ,
"I ' u I I " 0,
" "
1 II 1 , , n I I
"
o
, o 1
"
,
1 " 1 " "
I II n 0 0
Tabie C.J!J: T he truth la bll' "f EIIS·O!! IIllB II" hj, I, 1"..., ~ ll " k'i1 1 f"llh a l gau- ..I.
lnput A luput B Stl ll'k· ill·j) Stuck-at-t
,I , :It u, IJ~ I:', !/':! r', r, u, /): 1 /':1 /0', ':'1 ('I 0, 0"
, II ,
"
,
"I' II II " "II"
,
:: i ~ 0 1I': , 1 " , n " , , , , " , 1, , , , , " , , , 1 , (J (J 1 I0 I
"
o , 1
"
, II II , , , , I
Table C, 'IO: T he truth table or EIIS·O Il UIIIl whirh hils" stur-k-at (atl ll at gil le · ,~ .
B ,!·lIl A Inp ut B Slllfk·i11·jl Slllrk·at-1
:'L, ..I HI 1/1 II EI I~'I (' , ('1 o, 0, I~l p.l C· l ('l 0, 0,
I"
, II I II ,
"
, 0 1 , I , I
"
, , II I II II , , 0 1 0
: J
I 0 0
1 0 , , I II II I , II I II , 0 0
1 0 , , 0 I II II II , 0 I 0 , 0
Table CAl : T he trut h table of EIIS·OH HUH I\'hirh ll<l~ , , ~ l lI di ' il l fault i\1 ~" , ••. , ;
lnput A Ill Pli1 B xruck-at-u II Sl lI d ';" l l ·l
.J ..I, 0, /I, 1;', r:~ i ; (' , , ('~ ! IJ! ·/J~ I" ;' I ' :' ) ( , '., ,,!,1I'~ /1:
\I I \I I \I
I ·, " !"r' ~ \I '1\1 i '-1" \I T\I I I II I
\I I" o! I II i I I ''ii''i I I \II \I \I I I II I U u ill I \1 1 1 II II ' I I II
I 0 I 0 0 1 I II I II (J I l l....!.....-..!..-. L-!.-
Table CA2: T he tru th t able of EI IS·OIl llll llll'llil'h I",S " s l ll, l-;,.d [.'Ult <II ~.'I ,' .7
:~
I
I
I
\I
Input Input B
1"'1\1
Slm '\"
..I I
"
IJ Ii I,,: h' n /). 11; I·.'J l-. l
U I U I U , I n
'lI" Il "0 I I \I I II I U () J II u !I 0 0 I I () I u u \ U tl II \I I \I \I I I \I \I u II I I J
Table C,43: T he truth labl!' of 1': 115·0 1( 1II11 I II'hid l hi ls ;, sI Ll<Ii ,ill fil lil l ••1 .I!,.II . ·· ....
Input A Input.B Stuck-Ill ·n S I,..-k·ll l· \
A . .t B fi E f,· f ·, ( 'J n, /)J I/:', 1;'1 ( '1 C:~4\I U I ' \I I
"
\1 1
0 I
\I lOT II0 I I 0 I 0 II I I \I I II \I I I I
I 0 0 I I II \I I I \I I \I II I I I
I II 1 0 0 1 I 0 I II 0 I I II I I
Tabl e CA4: T he trut h tab le or I ~ II S · ()H Ilfl ll whirh Il<ls., s l ilt 1,;' ;11 [" ull ;11 \\,, 11"')
I nput A Input B Sl ur k-al ·O Sl ulk ' i\l , l
!I I .-1 2 a, o, 1::• I:'J '., I ·, n, /1! 1:'1 I :'! I ( ' , c, IJ, OJ
0 I 0 I \I \I I I I I I \I I "rI \I III I I II I 0 \I I : \I I I I I \I \I
I 0 0 I I II II I I I II I I I I I \I \I
I 0 1 0 0 II \I \I II \I \I I i j u I II
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Appendix D
Verifications of TSC property for
the proposed MF BBBs
Tab le 0 .1: The truth table or ~ IF·O H llllllll' !ti"h hils '1'\1\1'1;· ,1"\ r.l1111 '" l1,;II('. I .
Table D.3: The tru th l ll h ll~ of ~ 1F· O lf Il ili l wl,iclt IiiI' ,I "Iwk·;,[·l (ault il l. ~il l e' ~'
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Table 0 .4: T he t rut h tab le of ~,.[F-OH IHill which has it surck-at-Il fault at gare-Z,
Table 0 .5: T he t ruth tnhlc of i\1F-O I1 BB:lw hich h,,:; <I stuck.ar- l f",ull al gate-S .
Table 0 .6: T he t ruth table of i\IF-On [m il whichIms II sl l1,·I' -Il L-O Fault al gate-S .
Table 0 .7: The tru t h table of i\IF·on IIBll whirh ha _~ a st uek-ur-J fallit nl getc-l .
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Table 0 .8: The truth table of ~ [F'oO H HUBwhich h<l>l ;\ "111fk·al-Ofault at gatl' o,\.
Table 0.9; The trut h table of ;"1F·OH IIBll \\'llirl1lii\s a sllwk·;ll· l fault ill p:ah ·-.'1.
Table 0.10: The t ruth table or ;"ll·-·OH IJi1B whirl l hOi s u sun-k-ur-n Faultilt W11(' -;i
Table 0 ,11: The tr uth table of :'IF-OII BIIIl \\"Ilid l !lI tS , I sl 01 ('1-; -<11-1Inul! ill ~il t('-IL
177
Table 0 .12; Th e truth table of l\ fF ·Olt BUI1which lws a st uek-at-Il fault at gate-fl.
Table 0.1 3: T he truth table or \1 F·OII BIlll whuh hilSil ~ 1 1l(' k·iLl·1 Faultat gale-7.
Table 0 .14: The t ruth tab le of MF-OR BRII which has a st uck-at-Il fault at gate-j.
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Table 0. 15: The t ruth tab le of ~ l F'·OH BnB \\'hi"h l l,l~ ,1 ~1 11O·k· a t · l Iaulr at g:l l ,'·~ .
Table 0 .16: The trut h tab le of ~ lF'·OH Im ll which I l:l.~ il suu-k-ar-u (:lldt ilt gil ll.'·~.
Table 0 .11: T he tr ut h table of ~1F-O Il BIlIl wllidl lms il sl lwk·a1.· 1 fault .u gil l('. ~J.
Table 0 .18: The truth t able of l\IF-O n nlll ll\'llidl hus 11 sl.lIl"k·"t ·\}f"ull ill I;ilt<,-!l.
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To1.hlcD .20: 'l'hc tnuh la hk ·o f?l!F ·OH Illlllwl li<.: h lliIS" sll wk·ill .0 fillllt ill gnl('. 10.
Table 1).21: The truth lab leo fMF·Oll lllHi which hils iI xuuk-nr-l f,lIlil ill gate -H .
Table 0 .22: The t ru th tahle ol ?l F·OH lllili whid , IIilS ., stuck -at-U f"uil lll gate - H.
ISO
Table 0 .23: T he truth tnbk- of .\I F·O ll ll ll ll whi, h h.I';1 ~l l lOk ,11 -1 f.ll d l ,11 ,!!..11,··1:?
Tab le D.25: The tr uth tnblc of ~I F· OI! Jjll il \\'lli.-l, 1",, ;1, llIl'k' ill ·1 fault ;II !!..,1,' · I:l.
Tab le D.26: Th e t ruth tnbleuf ~IF-OH [111 11\\'hif ll ll;IS<I slllt·k·<lt· l) Fauh.u gille·I: I.
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Table D.27: The truth t'llil,·"r .\IF·O Il IIll ll \rlikh li' I." , - llwl\-'ll · 1 ralll! ill ll,alt·· H .
Tnhlc D.28; The truth tnblen f :\IF· OH llllll whi<' h IHo'" " I III l.;· i<1.u (,111 11 i\ 1 !!"l ll·· I -1.
Tab le D.29: The tru th tnblcof .\ IF·OH IlIlll ",llii l. It.... il "1110'1,, ,11· I ralll! at !1,;ll\'·I .'j
Table D.30; The t ruth table of ~I F·OI { Il ll llwhid. ha-, 'l "ll1l"k·<ll·0 (illll! ill gilll'·I.i.
182
Table D.31: The tnn h table of 11F·0 1IIlil tl \\" lIi,IIhil ' ,I ~l ll ,k ·"I· 1 fnuh ,<I ~<II ,' ·l1 i
Table D.32: The tru th tahlc of :\11"·011 111111which hil~ ,' _lw k·.11 IIr,,1I1I"I ,:"11- It;.
Table D,33: The t ruth tahlcof :\IF·O H Illl lllI'l li,-llhi" " , I 11<!;. · ,, 1· I 1'.. 111 1 al !!,ill,·.l i .
Table D.34: The truth table of :\IF· O II llllll wl,i, l, !l.,...d ...11I<1;-d ( ·\1 L'1I1!ill !Iii""'"
183
Tuhle0 .:36: The truth ta ble of :'IF·O ll llll ll \\'ll idl 1111., a , lwk·ill ·Of"ll ll ill !!,llll'· IS.
Table 0 .:37: The truth tnbh- of :'Il l-'·{)1{ Ill l ll wlli, Ii !II I" II ~ llI d.;·a l-1 I'ilih ill !!,iltl'· ]!J.
Table 0 .38: The truth labl!' or :'III·- ·O lllll l ll ll" h i dll nl ~ " .11l1·k·iOl-!J f:m tl ...1 gilll'-19.
18<
Table D.39: T he t ru th ta hll!ur \ !F ·O If IIUB whid, 1'.' 0" ~ ., .. I.·;' I · 1 r.mh ,. 1 ~i\ h'. :!tI.
Tab le DAI : T he tr ut h tilhlt ' t1r:\IF·Ol l llll lt whi, 1.1"'0" 0'''' 1. "I 1 f,.,,11 ,.1 ~;.I . · · :!I .
Table D.42: T he t rut h ta ble oDIF-OIl IlUll wl,i. I,I" ,~" ,"" 1;-,,1·11 Iauh ;,1 ~;' '' '':! 1.
18.1
Table D..13: T he t ruth ta ble of ~[ F · O It 1::IHl whif h II"., i\ ~t ll ("k·"t·l Iault at giHc·t:!.
Table 0..1·1: Tile tr uth rablo or \I F·()I! Il11Jlwhi, h I""" , l u(·k·;, I ·O rilll l i at l;illl, .:n .
Table 0.'15: Th e truth tahlt' of \IF-OH 11IlU II'll il·l, IM i i' xtur-k-at-] faliit at
galc·23.
18<;
Table D.-I6: Till: t rut h I"hl.· uf \ 1F·() 11 111I11 whir-h ha-, .1 ~l lh·LI I II f;lllh al
ga te-23.
Table D.47: TIle t rut h lah1t' , If \ IF·O H lUll! whi..h 11ot". ;' ~l ll , - k' ;I ' I f.,ult .,\
ga.te·24.
Ta.ble DAg: Th e Irut h lal,I,- ..r \ IF -ll ll Il Ul1 ,, 1,;. 1, I , . ,~ . , ~ 1 ,1tk - .,I , l1 f.,,,11 ;,l
ga te·24.
Ta ble 0.4 9: T ile t ruth 1;,1.1,· " f :\1F·O Il IIJlJl .\hllh I,.•~ " ,111 01.;- .,1· 1 f,,'lll ;,1
gate-25.
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Table 0 .50: The tr uth lahlc or ~[[:·OJl rum which has ,I stuck- at-Il rault al
gate-25.
Table D..il : The t rut h tnhle of \I F·O Il Illl il wt,id , It;" il sl uck-a!.·1 fa ult at
gate· 26.
Table D,52: The truth ta ble or ~ IF-OH Bllll lI'hich 11<15 a stuck-at-Il fault at
gate·26,
\88
Appendix E
6-bit diagnostic sequence pairs
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Table E.I: T he ta ble of ij·bil di ilgllus lic sCqUClICI: IJa irs ( 11'\ - HIs).
w, W~ II W, ~f4 W~
W W WJ 1/.'·1 I/ ' .j lI'~ U'.~
1 0 1 1 0 11 1 0 1 1J I 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 , 0 I 0 1
1 0 0 I 0 1 11 I 1 11
0 1 0 I 1 0 0 I 11 I
1 U 1 U 1 0 I 0 I 0
Table £.2: T he table or ij·hil di ilgIlU.'1.ic S("I"l'I('I' pairs ( IV, - HIla),
w, W, W. \/l'g 11'10
'''''
W, w,
''''
w, w,
1 0 1 0 1 0
I : II ~o 1 0 1 I 0 0 I0 I 0 1 0 1 0 I
1 0 1 0 0 I U I 0 I
1 0 0 l 1 0 l 0 I 0
0 l 0 1 0 1 0 1 l 0
Ta ble £. 3: T he table or n-bu Iliaglioslir S('II(((~II('(' pain; ( IVII - U:15).
W"
lUll
w
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Table E.4: Th e table or {j·bit d illgl1<lsLic Sl'Qlll'IICC jl.,irs (Will - IF'wl.
Woo W17 W1 8~
lUl6 Woo lU17 WI : !l' IS w,s U' l " ~ 1l'1u if);;
1 0 L 0 L 0 L 0 L 11
0 1 0 1 L 0 L 11 L 11
1 0 L 0 0 1 11 L 0 L
1 0 1 0 0 L 11 1 L 0
0 L L 0 0 L L 11 11 1
1 0 0 L 0 1 L 0 11 1
Tabl e E.5: Th e table or 6·hit diagnosrlc SI'qlll· lIn.' pa irs ( 1""11 - lFl~').
W" W" W" W14 BIn
1I'"j.I W ·l·1 I('~" Wl~
1 0 U L 0 I 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 L 0 I 0
L 0 0 1 0 L 11 L I 11
L 0 0 L 0 L L 0 11 I
0 1 0 1 1 11 11 1 0 I
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